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INTRODUCTION
The district court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees
IASIS Healthcare Holdings, Inc. ("IASIS Healthcare"), Salt Lake Regional Medical
ij;

Center ("SLRMC"), Alan Davis, M.D. ("Dr. Davis"), and Wanda Updike, M.D. ("Dr.
Updike") (IASIS Healthcare, SLRMC, Dr. Davis, and Dr. Updike are referred to herein
as the "SLRMC Parties") and against Appellant Jodie K. Levitt, M.D. ("Dr. Levitt")
because Utah's Health Care Providers Immunity from Liability Act ("Immunity Act"),
Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-4, provides immunity to the SLRMC Parties. Specifically, the
Immunity Act grants the SLRMC Parties immunity with a presumption that they acted in
good faith and without malice, which can only be overcome by clear and convincing
evidence. Here, the SLRMC Parties have demonstrated undisputed facts that they are all
entitled to immunity, and Dr. Levitt has failed to overcome the presumption by clear and
convincing evidence.
Dr. Levitt is a neurosurgeon with active medical staff membership and surgical
privileges at SLRMC, which was owned by IASIS Healthcare. In 2011, Dr. Levitt
applied for a two-year renewal of her medical staff appointment and privileges.
However, because she had several peer reviews pending, SLRMC granted her only a sixmonth conditional reappointment. Thereafter, SLRMC reviewed Dr. Levitt's fileincluding several cases which had been sent to external reviewers, some of which were
pending review. SLRMC requested that as part of this process, Dr. Levitt address three
issues regarding her patient care: (a) the occurrence of multiple cerebral spinal fluid

1
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("CSF'') leaks; (b) multiple wrong site surgeries; and (c) her failure to list a personal
hospitalization for depression (less than two years earlier) on her reappointment
application. Dr. Levitt responded to these three issues.
Thereafter, an immediate situation arose involving Dr. Levitt's patient care, and
after meeting with representatives of SLRMC, including Dr. Davis (the Chair of the
Medical Executive Committee ("l\,ffiC"), Dr. Updike (the past lv.lEC Chair), and
SLRMC's then-CEO, Jeff Frandsen, her privileges were summarily suspended to ensure
patient safety. The next day, SLRMC outlined several requirements that Dr. Levitt would
have to fulfill for her summary suspension to be lifted:

i.

submit a proctoring plan to the Chief of Staff and CEO for
proctoring by a neurosurgeon in one lumbar case, one cervical case
and four other cases;

ii.

meet the requirements of a letter from the Credentialing Committee
dated January 30, 2012; and

iii.

submit a plan for backup coverage should she be out of town or
become unable to care for her patients.

Dr. Levitt requested a fair hearing. However, when Dr. Davis informed her that if
she participated in a fair hearing, an adverse action would need to be reported to the
National Practitioner Data Bank ("NPDB") because her suspension would then last
longer than 30 days, Dr. Levitt instead chose to complete the proctorship, and her
privileges were reinstated. She continues to practice at SLRMC.
The Immunity Act grants health care providers a presumption of immunity from
liability with respect to deliberations, decisions or determinations made or information
furnished in good faith and without malice while serving on peer review committees.
2
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The presumption of good faith and lack of malice upon which immunity is based can
only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of malice or lack of good faith.
The district court correctly held, because all of the SLRMC Parties' actions were
conducted during "deliberations, decisions, or determinations" made in the interest of
protecting patient care, the Immunity Act and its presumption apply. And, the cowt
correctly ruled that Dr. Levitt failed to set forth a disputed material fact sufficient to meet
the clear and convincing burden required to rebut the presumption of good faith and lack
of malice. On these bases, this Court should affirm the district court's grant of summary
judgment.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
ISSUE: Did the district court correctly enter Slll:lli11ary judgment in favor of the
SLRMC Parties on Dr. Levitt's claims where there was no genuine issue of material fact
and where Dr. Levitt failed to set forth clear and convincing evidence that IASIS
Healthcare, SLRMC, Dr. Davis, or Dr. Updike acted with bad faith or malice-even
when the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom were viewed in the light
most favorable to Dr. Levitt?

STANDARD OF REVIEW: Summary judgment decisions are reviewed for
correctness. See Portfolio Recovery Assocs., LLC v. Migliore, 2013 UT App 255, ,r 10,
314 P.3d 1069 ("We review a district court's grant of summary judgment for
correctness.").

~

3
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Further, "a party must prove a claim with clear and convincing evidence at the
summary judgment stage if that is the burden required at trial." Anda/ex Resources, Inc.

v. Myers, 871 P.2d 1041, 1046 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986).
PRESERVATION: This issue was preserved. Record (hereinafter "R.") 823-26,
976-77, 1028-29.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The following facts were of record before the district court.
1.

Dr. ~evitt is a neurosurgeon who currently has an active medical staff

membership with surgical privileges at SLRMC, which was owned by IASIS Healthcare.
R.2-3.
2.

Dr. Davis is a physician at SLRMC and during the relevant period was

Chief of Staff and Chair of the J\IBC, a peer review body, at SLRMC. R. 2, 918.

3.

Dr. Updike is also a physician at SLRMC, and at all relevant times was the

former MEC Chair and a member of the MEC. R. 2, 856.

Dr. Levitt's Application/or Reappointment and Conditional Reappointment
4.

In 2011 and 2012, ten of Dr. Levitt's cases were sent for review to

neurosurgeons with fellowships in spinal surgery. These reviewing specialists were not
affiliated with SLRMC. R. 920, 925, 929.
5.

In September 2011, Dr. Levitt applied for a two-year renewal of her

medical staff appointment and privileges. R. 4.

4
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6.

On November 23, 2011, SLRMC granted Dr. Levitt a six month conditional

reappointment to the SLRMC medical staff. R. 4, 1008. The letter granting the
reappointment (the "November 23 Letter") explained that the reappointment was
"conditional" because Dr. Levitt had several peer reviews pending. 1 Dr, Levitt also
alleges and admits that the November 23 Letter requested "clarification on [her]
hospitalization in the last five years and medications that [she] might be taking that may
affect either [her] clinical judgment or motor skills." R. 1008.
7.

The request for clarification of her hospitalization referred to the fact that

on her application, Dr. Levitt intentionally omitted her hospitalization for depression in
November 2009, which had occurred since her prior appointment. R. 4, 1003.
8.

Dr. Levitt admits that she intentionally omitted this hospitalization from her

application to "protect[] her privacy." Appellant's Opening Brief (hereinafter
"Aplt.Br.") at 8.
9.

On January 30, 2012, the SLRMC Credentials Committee informed Dr.

Levitt by letter (the "January 30 Letter") that it had reviewed six of her cases which had
been sent for external peer review and "two other recent occurrences." Dr. Levitt alleges
and admits that the Credentials Committee highlighted three specific issues:
i.

The Credentials Committee noted several CSF leaks in Dr. Levitt's
patients, and asked Dr. Levitt to establish a "written protocol for
handling CSF leaks."

1

Dr. Levitt admits that she was later twice given lists of cases that had been peer
reviewed-the first "[o]n or about February 24, 2012," R. 11, and the second "sometime
after March 16, 2012," R. 13.
5
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ii.

Gj

The Credentials Committee noted that Dr. Levitt had three wrong
site surgeries. Therefore, it asked her to establish a written protocol
for how she "will establish confirmation of correct site surgery in the
operating room." The Credentials Committee further warned her
that "another wrong site occurrence ... could [result in] termination
of privileges."

iii.

The Credentials Committee noted Dr. Levitt's omission from her
application of her November 2009 hospitalization. Accordingly, the
Credentials Committee warned her that it takes such omissions very
seriously, and explained that information must be documented so the
Committee would have "consistent and current information" since
her prior 2009 appointment. R. 1010.

10.

Dr. Levitt submitted written responses to the three issues raised in the letter.

11.

Dr. Levitt alleges that the January 30 Letter contained intentional

R.9.

misinformation that she omitted her 2009 hospitalization for depression and her current
medications. R. 8-9. However, Dr. Levitt admits that she did, in fact, intentionally omit
this hospitalization from her application. R. 3-4; Aplt.Br. at 8.
12.

Further, the January 30 Letter noted that simply disclosing her

Ci

hospitalization to the CEO was not sufficient because the CEO is not a member of the
Credentials Committee, and that the information needed to be on her application "in order

6
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i)

for ~e Credentials Committee [as a whole] to have consistent and current infonnation."
R. 9, 1010.
Summary Suspension

13.

On February 14, 2012, the CEO, Jeff Frandsen, Dr. Davis (Chair of the

l\IBC), and Dr. Updike (immediate past-MEC Chair and then-current l\1EC member) met
with Dr. Levitt to discuss a recent serious issue with Dr. Levitt's care of one of her
patients, which required immediate action. At that time, for the protection of patients,
SLRMC issued a summary suspension, which was thereafter ratified by the MEC. R.
920, 925, 929-30.
14.

~

Dr. Levitt states that the peer review cases "apparently led to the

suspension of [her] privileges at SLRMC," but also that they did not constitute any "good
faith information to be reasonably or otherwise concerned about [her] ability to provide
sound, quality and competent health care." R. 14.
15.

Neither IASIS Healthcare, SLRMC, Dr. Davis, nor Dr. Updike had any

motive to injure Dr. Levitt financially or otherwise. R. 920, 925, 930. The SLRMC
Parties submitted the declarations of all three individuals involved in the February 14,
2012 meeting, each of whom confirmed that his or her only motive in issuing the
summary suspension was to protect patients. Specifically, Dr. Davis, Dr. Updike and
CEO Frandsen declared that:
a.

There was no motive to injure Dr. Levitt financially or otherwise.

b.

There were no competing neurosurgeons involved in the initial

decision to issue a summary suspension.
7
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C.

The swnmary suspension was imposed in good faith and without
malice.

d.

16.

Their actions were taken to protect patients.

Dr. Levitt submitted evidence that, On February 15, 2012, SLRMC sent a

letter (the "February 15 Letter") confirming the suspension and setting forth the
conditions for the lifting of the suspension:
1.

Dr. Levitt must submit a proctoring plan for proctoring by a
neurosurgeon for one lwnbar case, one cervical case and four other
cases-a total of six proctored surgeries;

11.

Dr. Levitt must meet the requirements of the January 30, 2012 Letter
from the Credentialing Committee; and

iii.

Dr. Levitt must submit a plan for backup coverage should she be out
of town or become unable to care for her patients. R. 930, 1014-15.

17.

Dr. Levitt submitted a proctoring plan and completed seven surgeries at

IASIS facilities within the required time frame. R. 10, 12, 930.
18.

Dr. Levitt voluntarily apparently performed two additional surgeries with a

proctor at a non-IASIS facility, Lakeview Hospital. 3 R. 12; Aplt.Br. at 14, 28.

2

Mr. Frandsen's declaration (R. 928-30) does not reference the issue of competing
neurosurgeons.
3
There is no evidence in the record to support Dr. Levitt's assertions that Lakeview
Hospital is an IASIS facility (see Aplt.Br. at 13, 14, 28), nor does she cite any. In fact,
Lakeview Hospital is not an IASIS facility.
8
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19.

Upon completing the proctorship she also submitted written protocols for

addressing CSF leaks and wrong-site surgeries. R. 1030, 1244.
20.

Accordingly, on March 16, 2012, Dr. Levitt's privileges at SLRMC were

reinstated. R. 13. SLRMC never submitted a report to the NPDB on Dr. Levitt's

~

suspension. R. 834; see also R. 921, 926, 930.
21.

The lack of response to Dr. Levitt's inquiries for peer review information

was to protect the peer review privilege. R. 921, 926, 930. This was not refuted by Dr.
Levitt.
22.

The district court below ruled:

[W]e look for cases where we sort out an ulterior purpose from healthcare
improvement and the challenges that decide the primary purpose was
something impermissible like competitive exclusion, no evidence of that in
this case. Personal enmity, no testimony about that at all in this case.
Retaliation, nothing in this case suggests any retaliatory motive.
Discrimination on some improper purpose, nothing discussed in the
testimony about this.
Instead I'm asked to infer just from the sum total of what plaintiff contends
are missteps in the care review process[,] to infere [sic] from that m~lice.
And not only that[,] malice or lack of good faith by clear and convincing
evidence it would overcome a presumption, a statutory presumption of
good faith and lack of malice. I can't do that.
. . . I can't from just the fact of the summary suspension infer from that
there is some lack of good faith or malice. The proctoring requirements
seems more like an opportunity to seek reinstatement than it is some sort of
malicious action or some act taken in bad faith and that's borne out by the
fact that Dr. Levitt's privileges were ultimately reinstated.... I have
conclude[d] that plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in rebutting the
presumption of good faith and lack of malice and therefore all of the actions
complained of within the complaint are subject to the immunity under the
state law. I think it probably also subjects [defendants] to the immunity
granted in the bylaw, but I don't reach that. I think it is sufficient to say
that state law immunity applies and summary judgment should be granted.
9
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GI

R. 1248-49 (emphasis added).

Fair Hearing
23.

On February 15, 2012, SLRMC offered Dr. Levitt the opportunity to

complete a proctorship in exchange for a lifting of her suspension. R. 930, 101415.
24.

On February 28, 2012, Dr. Levitt requested an immediate,

emergency fair hearing to lift her suspension. R. 12.
25.

On or about March 8, 2012, Dr. Davis, responding to Dr. Levitt's

request, sent Dr. Levitt an email (i) stating that she would not be reported to the
NPDB if she completed her six proctored cases by the deadline, and (ii) cautioning
her that proceeding with a hearing would extend the suspension period and cause
her suspension to be reportable to the NPDB. Any hearing, he said,

would not be done on an emergent basis. You would have to request this
by March 16th to be within the 30-day window described in our bylaws. It
would be scheduled for some time in the future, by which time hopefully
you have already completed the proctoring. It may be stirring up material
that doesn't need to be reviewed again and could perhaps backfire.

R. 1043 (emphasis added). Dr. Levitt never responded. R. 1225.
26.

After receiving Dr. Davis's email, Dr. Levitt did not request a

hearing by March 16, 2012, the deadline set forth in the bylaws. R. 1225. Instead
of responding to Dr. Davis's email, Dr. Levitt completed the proctorship and, as
discussed above, her summary suspension was lifted on March 16, 2012. R. 13,
827-28.

10
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27.

There is no evidence in the record to support Dr. Levitt's assertion (see

Aplt.Br. at 9, fn. 3) that, since the time her suspension was lifted, she lost any operating
room 'block time' due to any action of the SLRMC Parties, or at all.

Tlte SLRMC Parties' Privilege Log
28.

On September 12, 2017 (R. 692, 735), and supplemented on October 24,

2017 (id), the SLRMC Parties produced a 137-page, detailed privilege log of peer review
documents. R. 435-571. An example of a privilege log entry4 is as follows:

TYPE
BATES NO.
TO
FROM
SUBJECT

PRIVILEGE
COMMENTS

Hospital Peer Review Report & supporting docs
SLRMC-PRIV 000335-36 (full document SLRMC-PRIV 00033353339)
SLRMC
Peer Reviewer
Re: 1/31/12 incident. Hospital Peer Review [of J. Levitt] Report
Reviewed by an outside Board Certified neurosurgeon, fellowship in
spinal surgery. Report dated 2/9/2012.
This report is privileged because it is from a "person" (Peer Reviewer)
and "health facility" (Peer Reviewer, acting on behalf of SLRMC) who
(b) furnished "statements" (peer review report); to "peer review
committees" (the MEC) and "any health facility's in-house staff
committee"; ( c) for the purpose of "study and advancing medical
research, with the purpose of reducing the incidence of disease,
morbidity, or mortality" and "the evaluation and improvement of
hospital and health care ( evaluating health care) rendered by hospitals
(SLRMC), health facilities, or health care providers (Dr. Levitt)." Utah
Code Ann. § 26-25-1.
This report is also privileged because it is (a) ''information in any form"
(a written report) which is (b) provided during and created specifically
as part of ... findings or conclusions or peer review, care review, or
quality assurance processes (the quintessential peer review process) of
(c) any organization of health care providers (SLRMC) (d) for the
purpose of evaluating care provided to reduce morbidity and mortality
or to improve the quality of medical care, or for the purpose of peer
review of the ethics, competence, or professional conduct of any health

4

This entry is found at R. 499.
11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

care provider (evaluating Levitt's patient care and competence). Utah
R.Civ.P.26 b.

@

29.
~

Dr. Levitt never challenged a single document on the privilege log. R.

1198-99.
Dr. Levitt's Failure to Conduct Depositions

30.

The district court set a fact discovery deadline of February 27, 2017. R. 52.

Dr. Levitt failed to conduct any discovery before that deadline. R. 782.
31.

Dr. Levitt filed a motion for extension of discovery after the expiration of

the discovery deadline. R. 68 et seq.
32.

On May 25, 2017, the district court granted Dr. Levitt a 90-day extension

for discovery until August 23, 2017. R. 143 et seq. The Court in its ruling warned Dr.
Levitt that the court would not "be receptive of additional extensions." R. 1096.
33.

Dr. Levitt failed to conduct full discovery prior to the Court's extended

deadline and, again, let the August 23, 2017 discovery deadline pass without taking any
depositions. R. 737.
34.

Nevertheless, the SLRMC Parties stipulated that discovery could be

extended yet again until November 23, 2017, "only [for the] depositions of the witnesses
previously disclosed by the parties." R. 263-64.
35.

When Dr. Levitt made an eleventh-hour request in the middle of November

to take depositions, she suggested that depositions be taken the very next day and on two
days on which the SLRMC Parties' counsel were unavailable. The SLRMC Parties
offered up seven other days, spanning two weeks, on which they were available. Dr.
12
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Levitt and her counsel responded that they were not available on any of those days due to
Plaintiffs schedule the first week and her counsel's schedule the second week. R. 77375.
36.

Dr. Levitt served no notices of deposition. R. 737 .

37.

Dr. Levitt filed a second motion for an extension of time on November 20,

2017. R. 658 et seq.
38.

SLRMC filed its opposition to Dr. Levitt's second motion for an extension

of time on December 4, 2017. R. 732 et seq.
39.

Discovery was closed as of the time SLRMC filed its Motion for Summary

Judgment on December 27, 2017. See R. 263-64, 823, 848.
40.

Despite three extensions of the discovery cutoff, Dr. Levitt never deposed

anyone. The uncontroverted, material, sworn facts contained in the declarations of Mr.
Frandsen and Drs. Davis and Updike were never controverted by Dr. Levitt. R. 736-37.
41.

Dr. Levitt did not challenge the Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule

56(d) and did not make any argument under Rule 56(d), nor did she submit any affidavit
or declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d). See generally, R. 976 et seq.
42.

At the hearing on the SLRMC Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment on

February 7, 2018, the district court had Dr. Levitt's second motion for an extension of
discovery before it, and the Court in effect denied that motion by granting the Motion for
Summary Judgment. R: 1216, 1249.
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
IASIS Healthcare, SLRMC, Dr. Davis, and Dr. Updike are all immune from Dr.
Levitt's claims under the Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann.§ 58-13-4. The Immunity Act
grants a presumption that the SLRMC Parties acted in good faith and without malice,
which can only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. The
district court properly granted summary judgment because the SLRMC Parties set forth
undisputed facts that entitle them to immunity and Dr. Levitt, as a matter of law, failed to
overcome the presumption of good faith by clear and convincing evidence. Whether
viewed individually or in aggregate, neither the allegations set forth by Dr. Levitt nor the
inferences reasonably drawn therefrom can clearly and convincingly overcome the
statutory presumption.

ARGUMENT

I.

THE SLRMC PARTIES ARE IMMUNE UNDER UTAH'S IMMUNITY
STATUTE.
The SLRMC Parties are immune from liability under the Immunity Act because

all actions they took qualify for protection under the Immunity Act and because Dr.
Levitt cannot rebut the presumption of good faith and lack of malice by clear and
convincing evidence, as a matter of law.

A.

Utah's Immunity Statute Bars Dr. Levitt's Claims.

The peer and care review privileges (and their accompanying statutory immunity)
allow health care providers to freely evaluate the quality of health care rendered by their
colleagues via peer review and care review, and protect health care providers who furnish
14
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information pursuant to such reviews. See Benson ex rel Benson v. LH.C. Hospitals, Inc.,
866 P.2d 537, 539-40 (Utah 1993). The weight of Utah authority "grants deference to
hospital officials' professional judgment" for corrective actions affecting hospital staff.
See Don Houston, MD., Inc. v. lntermountain Health Care, Inc., 933 P.2d 403,408

(Utah Ct. App. 1997). As the Utah Supreme Court has explained, "hospitals are entitled
to exercise good faith medical judgment, which courts should not lightly question in
subsequent civil suits," and the Utah Supreme Court has given "great deference to a
hospital's decision to decide whether medical standards of practice have been met."
Brinton v. lHC Hospitals, Inc., 973 P.2d 956, 964 (Utah 1998). For these reasons, among

others, Utah has provided statutory immunity to participants in the peer review process.
Utah's Immunity Act provides:
Health care providers ... and the organizations or entities sponsoring these
activities are immune from liability with respect to deliberations, decisions,
or determinations made or information furnished in good faith and without
malice [when serving on or sponsoring committees] established to evaluate
and improve the quality of health care or determine whether provided
health care was necessary, appropriate, [or] properly performed [or
committees established] to evaluate or review the diagnosis or treatment of,
or the performance of health or hospital services to, patients within this
state.
Utah Code Ann.§ 58-13-4 (emphasis added). "[P]ersons furnishing information to those
committees are entitled to the same immunity." Id

B.

The Immunity Act Presumes Good Faith and Lack of Malice and
Requires Clear and Convincing Evidence to Overcome That
Presumption.

The Immunity Act also grants SLRMC a presumption of immunity, which can
only be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence of lack of good faith and malice. Utah
15
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Code Ann. § 5 8-13-4(4) ("Health care providers serving on committees or providing
information described in this section are presumed to have acted in good faith and
without malice, absent clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.")
"[A] party must prove a claim with clear and convincing evidence at the summary
judgment stage if that is the burden required at trial." Andalex Resources, 871 P.2d at
1046 (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254); see also Essential Botanical Farms, LC v. Kay,
2011 UT 71, 270 P.3d 430 (summary judgment appropriate where, even viewing
evidence in light most favorable to nonmoving party, that party did not meet the clear and
convincing standard); Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp., 2009 UT 2,201 P.3d 966
(summary judgment warranted if plaintiff fails to supply evidence which, if accepted as
true, would clearly and convincingly support each element of a claim); Republic Group,

Inc. v. Won-Door Corp., 883 P.2d 285 (Utah Ct. App 1994) (summary judgment
appropriate where plaintiff failed to provide evidence which could prove, clearly and
convincingly, each element of its claim); see also Singh v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield of

Massachusetts, Inc., 308 F.3d 25, 36 (1st Cir. 2002) (statutory healthcare immunity
determinations should be made "expeditiously" and "as soon as possible during the
course of litigation" so that "insubstantial claims should not proceed to trial"). To meet
the clear and convincing standard, a party must show "the existence of facts that make a
conclusion 'very highly probable."' Essential Botanical Farms, 2011 UT 71 at 124.

16
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i.

The SLRMC Parties Set Forth Undisputed Facts Showing They
Acted in Good Faith and Without Malice.

IASIS Healthcare, SLRMC, Dr. Davis, and Dr. Updike set forth undisputed
facts--including both subjective and objective evidence-showing (a) that the Immunity
Act applied to each of them, 5 and (b) that each acted in good faith and without malice,
thus qualifying for immunity. First, the SLRMC Parties submitted the declarations of Dr.
Alan Davis, Dr! Wanda Updike, and Jeff Frandsen (then-CEO), all of whom were present
at the meeting imposing the summary suspension. R. 918 et seq., 923 et seq., 928 et seq.
All three stated that their "only motivation" in issuing the suspension and in taking any
prior or subsequent action that affected Dr. Levitt "was to protect patients." R. 920, 925,
930. They further testified in their declarations that they did not have "any motive to
injure Dr. Levitt financially or otherwise," and that "all ... actions" they took with
respect to Dr. Levitt "were taken in good faith and without malice towards her." Id. Dr.
Levitt did not controvert that evidence in any way. She chose not to take a single
deposition, including any deposition of Ors. Davis and Updike, or Mr. Frandsen. R. 737.
Thus, the sworn declarations regarding lack of bad faith and malice stand uncontroverted
by Dr. Levitt (other than by the conclusory labels set forth in her initial Complaint and
continuing through her Appellate Brief).
Second, there is substantial objective evidence that demonstrates the lack of bad
faith or malice, including the following:
5

All actions the SLRMC Parties took were "deliberations, decisions, or determinations"
made with respect to committees "established to evaluate and improve the quality of
health care" (see Utah Code Ann. § 58-13-4). Dr. Levitt has never disputed the
applicability of the Immunity Act to the SLRMC Parties.

17
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•

SLRMC sent Dr. Levitt's cases to outside, unaffiliated neurosurgeons with
fellowships in spinal surgery to be peer reviewed (R. 920, 925, 929, 494500);

•

SLRMC sent the November 23 Letter notifying Dr. Levitt of her pending
peer reviews, and later twice gave her lists of her cases that had been peer
reviewed (R. 4, 11, 13);

•

SLRMC'S November 23 Letter evidenced concern for patient care,
requesting additional infonnation regarding Dr. Levitt's hospitalization and
her clinical judgment and motor skills (R. 4-5, 1008);

•

SLRMC notified Dr. Levitt in the January 30 Letter that the request for
information about her hospitalization since the time of her prior
appointment was so the Credentials Committee could have "consistent and
current information" (R. 9, 1010);

•

SLRMC notified Dr. Levitt of the Credentials Committee's concerns about
Dr. Levitt's multiple patient CSF leaks and wrong site surgeries, and asked
her to establish written protocols for preventing these problems, again
evidencing concern for patient care (R. 1010);

•

Jeff Frandsen, Dr. Davis, and Dr. Updike met with Dr. Levitt on February
14, 2012 to discuss patient care issues (R. 10, 920, 925, 929-30);

18
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•

Dr. Levitt understood and acknowledged that it was the peer reviewed cases
which "apparently led to the suspension of [her] privileges at SLRMC" (R.
14);

•

SLRMC offered Dr. Levitt the option of having her privileges reinstated by
completing a proctorship before the 30-day period which would make the
suspension reportable to the NPDB (R. 921, 930); 6

•

SLRMC reappointed Dr. Levitt to hospital staff upon successful completion
of the 2012 proctorship (R. 13, 921), where she has remained ever since.

Given these facts and testimony, the SLRMC Parties provided undisputed facts
showing that they acted in good faith and without malice.
ii.

Dr. Levitt Has Not Met Her Burden to Show Clear and
Convincing Evidence of Bad Faith or Malice.

Dr. Levitt attempts to overcome the presumption of immunity by merely alleging
bad faith and malice. However, Dr. Levitt cannot show these factors at all, let alone by
clear and convincing evidence.
Although the Immunity Act does not define malice, courts and legislatures dealing
with the issue make clear that "malice" is a very high standard. See, e.g., Scappatura v.
Baptist Hospital ofPhoenix, 584 P.2d 1195, 1201 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (superseded by
statute) (malice is a "primary purpose other than the safeguarding of patients" and
imports "a wish to vex, annoy or injure another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act,

6

The suspension was for only 28 days so that Dr. Levitt could complete a proctorship
and be reinstated without having to report this action to the NPDB. Any suspension
beyond 30 days would have to be reported to the NPDB. R. 930.
19
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established either by proofor presumption of law") (emphasis added); Ariz. Rev. Stat.

Ann.§ 36-441(A) (malice is "evil intent and outrageous, oppressive or intolerable
conduct that creates a substantial risk of tremendous harm to others").
Dr. Levitt did not demonstrate malice or lack of good faith by clear and
convincing evidence. 7 Dr. Levitt claims the SLRMC Parties acted in bad faith by
asserting the peer review privilege, thereby "shrouding the reasons for the suspension in a
conspiracy of secrecy" 8 and "den[ying] her the opportunity even to know the basis for her
suspension." Aplt.Br. at 4. This theory is factually and legally incorrect. Dr. Levitt does
not (and cannot) dispute that she was given notice of the bases for her suspension on
multiple occasions: (a) the November 23 letter granting conditional privileges expressly
informed her that there were "several peer reviews pending" (R. 1008); (b) the January
30 Letter from the Credentials Committee informed her of two serious problems with her
surgical procedures, each of which had multiple occurrences (R. 1010); (c) Mr. Frandsen,
G¼)

Dr. Davis, and Dr. Updike met with Dr. Levitt to discuss issues with patients on February
14, 2012 (R. 10, 920, 925, 929-30); and (d) Dr. Levitt was twice provided lists of

7

See Scappatura, 584 P.2d at 1201 (granting defendants' motion for summary judgment
because "mere allegations of malice or bad faith ... will not suffice to allow an action
against hospital personnel engaging in peer review."); Harris v. Bellin Memorial
Hospital, 13 F.3d 1082, 1088 (7th Cir. 1994) ("plaintiff's conclusory statements ...
insufficient to raise a genuine issue as to defendants' motives" where "plaintiff offered
almost no deposition testimony in support of his position," and urged the court to make
unsupported inferences); Veldhuis v. Allan, 416 N.W.2d 347,350 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)
(mere "speculation concerning defendants' alleged nefarious motives" was insufficient).
8
To the extent that there was any "secrecy," as the district court observed, there was "a
simple explanation for that secrecy"-i.e., "to preserve the peer review privilege" and
"protect[] healthcare processes within the entity." R. 1248-49.
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potentially problematic cases that had been sent to outside neurosurgeons for peer review

~

(R. 11, 13 ). Based on this, Dr. Levitt had more than adequate notice of the reasons for
her suspension, and at the very least it shows good faith and lack of malice.
As to the assertion that the SLRMC Parties produced only a "handful" of
documents (Aplt.Br. at 4), that, too, is incorrect. Rather, the SLRMC Parties produced
approximately 3 83 pages of unprivileged documents-315 of which were produced with
their initial disclosures at the outset of the case. R 735. And, Dr. Levitt fails to note that
the SLRMC Parties submitted a 137-page, highly detailed privilege log, and Dr. Levitt
failed to challenge the privilege designation ofa single document. R. 435-571, 1198-99.
In any event, the Utah Rules of Evidence provide, "No inference may be drawn
from any claim of privilege" whether "in the present proceeding or upon a prior
occasion." Utah R. Evid. Sl0(c). Thus, any privilege the SLRMC Parties asserted "is not
a proper subject of comment" by Dr. Levitt or her counsel, id., and no inferences should
be drawn therefrom. 9 See Rechsteiner v. Haze/den, 753 N. W.2d 496, 518 (Wis. 2008)
( assertion of the peer review privilege, even if incorrect, is not indicia of bad faith and
does not create a genuine issue of material fact that rebuts the statutory presumption of
good faith) (emphasis added).
Finally, even if the peer review was conducted "in secrecy," as Dr. Levitt
contends, (it was not,) secrecy is not a sufficient basis to infer malice. See, e.g., Everett

9

This includes Dr. Levitt's references to, and inferences based on, any alleged "shroud of
secrecy," "conspiracy of secrecy," "conspiratorial wall of silence," "lack of
transparency," "hiding behind the peer review privilege," "refusing to discuss the issues
with her," and any others grounded in the SLRMC Parties' assertion of privilege.
21
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v. St. Ansgar Hosp., 974 F.2d 77, 80 (8th Cir. 2018) ("We decline to adopt Everett's
argument that because the third-party review was conducted in secret, without his input
as to who the reviewers should be, there is a necessary inference of malice.") As the
district court noted, there is a "necessity for preserving the privilege around protecting
healthcare processes within the [hospital]." R. 1249.
Next, Dr. Levitt claims SLRMC acted in bad faith by its purported "outright denial
of her request for the fair hearing required by the bylaws." Aplt.Br. at 5. Again, this is
factually inaccurate and contradicted by the record. Dr. Levitt did request a fair hearing,
and Dr. Davis responded to that request. R. 1043. In fact, Dr. Levitt herself produced the
email from Dr. Davis in which he advised Dr. Levitt of the deadline to request a hearing
and the potential ramifications of a hearing. See id. It is undisputed that Dr. Levitt did
•

I
l

not respond to Dr. Davis's email. R. 1225. Instead, Dr. Levitt completed the proctorship
offered to her, R. 13, 827-28, which was an immediate pathway back to full privileges
that Dr. Levitt could complete without a fair hearing, and without any report to the
NPDB.
Dr. Levitt also attacks SLRMC's purported "missteps in communication,
including drafting documents and delaying their delivery" as evidence of bad faith.
Aplt.Br. at 5. However, there is no evidence in the record showing the reason for these
delays. 10 Dr. Levitt did, in any event, provide the information requested by the January

10

Dr. Levitt posits that part of the delay in obtaining information was due to the
"decision makers" being out for the December holidays (Aplt.Br. at 10)-but being out
on holiday is not bad faith or malice.
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30 Letter within four days, even though the letter gave her significantly longer to do so.
R. 1003.
Additionally, Dr. Levitt claims SLRMC acted in bad faith by granting her a
"conditional reappointment" and, by requesting "further clarification ori [her]
hospitalization in the last five years and medications that [she] might be taking that may
affect either [her] clinical judgment or motor skills." ApltBr. at 9. However, ensuring
the accuracy of information and the competence of physicians to treat patients is at the
core of IASIS Healthcare, SLRMC, Dr. Davis, and Dr. Updike's mission to protect
patients. Dr. Levitt contends that this request was evidence of bad faith because the
hospital CEO was "already aware of the hospitalization." Aplt.Br. at 8. However, as the
January 30 Letter explained, the written disclosure was necessary "in order for the
Credentials Committee to have consistent and current information.... The CEO is not a
member of the Credentials Committee." R. 1010. Further, Dr. Levitt quotes the
attestation section of the application, which states "I have the responsibility to keep this
application current by informing the facility, through the Chief Executive Officer, of any
changes in the areas of inquiry contained herein." Aplt.Br. at 12. This attestation clearly
cannot be applied retrospectively to excuse intentional and material omissions in Dr.
Levitt's application, but rather can only be applied prospectively, to cover events and
circumstances taking place after the application was submitted. Dr. Levitt cannot

C.
credibly argue that it was malicious or in bad faith for SLRMC to insist on an accurate,
complete, consistent, written application, especially given personnel turnover (in fact, the
CEO to whom Dr. Levitt disclosed her 2009 hospitalization no longer works at SLRMC
23
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(R. 928)). And, there is no dispute that Dr. Levitt did, in fact, intentionally omit this
hospitalization from her application. Aplt.Br. at 8; R. 3-4. In any event, even if the
request for infonnation were viewed, as she claims, as a significant professional criticism
. (it cannot be), this is not bad faith or malice as a matter of law. See Gilbert v. Board of
Medical Examiners of State ofArizona, 745 P.2d 617, 627 (Az. Ct. App. 1987) (granting
summary judgment in favor of hospital because "[p]rofessional criticism or disapproval
does not constitute malice.")
Dr. Levitt then claims the SLRMC Parties acted in bad faith by "inexplicably
and "wrongfully" suspending her privileges for 28 days and requiring her to do a
proctorship. before having her privileges reinstated. Aplt.Br. at 12. However, there is no
evidence that the suspension was "wrongful." Rather, it is apparent that there were a
number of patient.safety issues that needed to be addressed (e.g., multiple CSF leaks and
wrong site surgeries), which Dr. Levitt does not dispute. R. 1010. Dr. Levitt further
claims that she was "wrongfully required to complete seven proctored surgeries" in one
week, but that the two proctored cases she performed at the "IASIS Lakeview Hospital"
were denied inclusion among the required surgeries, causing her to perform "a total of
nine proctored surgeries." Aplt.Br. at 14. However, her suspension letter requires her to
complete six proctored surgeries, not seven (R. 1014-15), and Lakeview Hospital is not
an IASIS facility. Further, the fact that Dr. Levitt was suspended for only 28 days isfurther evidence of good faith, because this would avoid the necessity of having to report
the suspension to the NPDB.
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Thus, the district court correctly concluded "I can't from just the fact of the
summary suspension infer from that that there is some lack of good faith or malice,"
noting that the "proctoring requirements seems more like an opportunity to seek
reinstatement than it is some sort of malicious act or some act taken in bad faith and
that's borne out by the fact that Dr. Levitt's privileges were ultimately reinstated." R.
1249. See Regualos v. Community Hospital, 364 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. App. 1985) (no
evidence of malice where reviewing physicians recruited outside experts to evaluate
plaintiff physician's work and allowed plaintiff to reapply for privileges upon successful
completion of a proctorship). 11
None of Dr. Levitt's allegations of bad faith or malice can be supported by clear
and convincing evidence, and summary judgment was appropriate. See, e.g., Scappatura,
584 P.2d at 1201 (affirming summary judgment and finding insufficient evidence of bad
faith or malice, stating that "mere allegations of malice or bad faith, even with
specifications of personal animosity and possible prior overreaching of authority, will not
suffice to allow an action against hospital personnel engaging in peer review"); Han·is,
13 F.3d at 1090 (upholding summary judgment under a clear and convincing standard
because, among other reasons, the hospital "reasonably perceived [the surgeon] to pose a
threat to its patients, and [the hospital's] primary purpose throughout the conduct of the
11

In Regualos, the plaintiff physician took advantage of the hearing process. However, in
detennining whether malice existed, the court did not focus on the fact that a hearing
had taken place; instead, the court focused on the fact that the hospital had recruited
outside experts to review the physician's cases, seeing this as evidence that the
reviewing physicians had "fair-mindedly sought to assess plaintiff's competency."
Regualos, 364 N.W.2d at 727.
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peer review was safeguarding them"); 12 Limjoco v. Schenck, 486 N.W.2d 567, 571 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1992) (affirming grant of summary judgment for hospital where surgeon alleged
that hospital had a "grudge" against him, and that there was an economic motive behind
defendants' actions, bec8;use surgeon's "conclusory statements" and lack of "established
facts from which inferences of bad faith could be drawn" meant that summary judgment
was appropriate); Rechsteiner, 153 N.W.2d at 517 (affirming summary judgment and
upholding grant of immunity to hospital where surgeon's "conclusory statements do not
permit his claims to survive summary judgment"); Talwar v. Catholic Health.care
Partners, 258 Fed. App'x. 800 (6th Cir. 2007) (affirming grant of summary judgment
where physician alleged that hospital breached contract by investigating him, failing to
disclose the initiation of an investigation, and temporarily suspending him, noting Ohio
common law requiring clear and convincing evidence of actual malice, and stating that
"mere inaccuracies in statements and alleged improper motivations by speakers are
insufficient to show actual malice"); Gureasko v. Bethesda Hospital, 689 N.E.2d 76, 8384 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (affirming grant of summary judgment and immunity where
physician failed to produce clear and convincing evidence that hospital and defendant
physicians acted with actual malice).
As the Court explained in granting summary judgment in Harris, where
clear and convincing evidence was required to overcome the statutory presumption
of good faith:

12

In Harris, the Seventh Circuit adopted Scappatura's definition of malice as "a primary
purpose other than the safeguarding of patients." Harris, 13 F.3d at 1090.
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None of [the surgeon's] allegations, taken individually or in the aggregate,
would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that [the hospital] did not
conduct [itself] in good faith. . . . [A ]n imperfect investigation does not in
itself constitute one that was conducted in bad faith, and defendants'
actions clearly do not sink to such a level that lack of good faith could be
inferred solely from the conduct of the peer review. Because [the
surgeon's] allegations that defendants had a motive to skew the peer review
against him are unsupported by any credible evidence, he has failed to meet
his burden of demonstrating that a reasonable jury could find that the
defendants did not act in good faith.

Harris, 13 F.3d at 1090. Likewise, in this case, none of Dr. Levitt's allegations or
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, taken individually or in the aggregate,
can support any contention that IASIS Healthcare, SLRMC, Dr. Davis, or Dr.
Updike conducted themselves in bad faith or with malice.

II.

DR. LEVITT DID NOT CHALLENGE A SINGLE DOCUMENT ON THE
SLRMC PARTIES' PRIVILEGE LOG.
Dr. Levitt claims, in passing, that the district court erred in making its summary

judgment ruling "based on proffers and affidavits without the aid of [documents from the
privilege log]." ApltBr. at 4. However, as previously stated, the SLRMC Parties not
only produced 383 pages of unprivileged documents, but also provided a 137-page
privilege log of documents protected by the peer review/ care review privilege under
Utah Code Ann.§ 26-25-1 and§ 26-25-3, and/or Rule 26(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. R. 435-571. Dr. Levitt never challenged a single document on the privilege
log, 13 though the onus was on her to do so. The district court made this clear to Dr.

Gi
Levitt, stating,

13

At one point, Dr. Levitt challenged "all" the documents on Defendants' privilege log,
without specifying why any particular document should be discoverable. R. 690-94.
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That strikes me as your burden.... You've got a privilege log. You
haven't identified any particular document on the log that you take issue
with the claim ofprivilege. It strikes me as it's your burden to come
forward and say, "I don't think this is a legitimate claim ofprivilege. "
R. 1196 (emphasis added).
Having initially been given the privilege log on September 12, 2017, Dr. Levitt
had the log during the time the parties were filing and responding to statements of
discovery issues (see, e.g., R. 817 et seq., dated December 14, 2017), yet she did not
challenge any particular document on the privilege log. She cannot now claim that she
"never got that chance to view the documents or even to set forth which documents the
court should review." Aplt.Br. at 4.

ID.

DISCOVERY WAS COMPLETE AND DR. LEVITT DID NOT
CHALLENGE THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT UNDER
RULE 56(d).
Dr. Levitt also claims that discovery was not completed before oral argument on

the Motion for Summary Judgment, and asks this Court to "remand this case with
instructions to conclude discover[y]." Aplt.Br. at 6, 30. However, that issue has not been
appealed by Dr. Levitt and it therefore is not a proper subject of this appeal.
Even if the issue were properly before this Court, it is meritless. For over a yearfrom the filing of the Complaint on February 8, 2016 until the February 27, 2017
discovery cutoff- Dr. Levitt failed to take any discovery. After the deadline, Dr. Levitt
filed her first motion to extend discovery, and at the hearing, her counsel's reasons for
failing to conduct discovery included not only health issues, but also that he was
"discombobulated," that he had celebrated several family birthdays and an anniversary,
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and "leap year stuff." R. 1081-84. The Court granted a 90-day extension until August
23, 2017 (R. 194), but warned Dr. Levitt's counsel "I don't think I'd be receptive of
additional extensions" (R. 1096).
Dr. Levitt let the August 23, 2017 second discovery deadline pass without taking a
single deposition, and the parties stipulated to an extension until November 23, 2017,
"only [for the] depositions of the witnesses previously disclosed by the parties." R. 26364. However, Dr. Levitt waited until mid-November to request three depositions-the
first on one days' notice and the second and third on dates when the SLRMC Parties'
counsel were unavailable. R. 773-75. When the SLRMC Parties indicated their
availability on seven other November dates, Dr. Levitt and her counsel responded that
they were unavailable on all of those dates. Id Dr. Levitt never served any notices of
deposition. R. 737.
Instead, on November 20, 2017, Dr. Levitt filed a second motion for extension of
discovery. R. 658 et seq. The SLRMC Parties filed their opposition on December 4,
2017. R. 732 et seq. The SLRMC Parties filed their Motion for Summary Judgment on
December 27, 2017. R. 823 et seq. On March 2, 2018, the district court granted the
SLRMC Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment, mooting Dr. Levitt's second motion for
extension of discovery. R. 1064-65.
Moreover, in responding to the SLRMC Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment,
Dr. Levitt never filed any motion, affidavit or declaration under Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 56(d) requesting additional discovery. Rule 56(d) requires that if, "for
specified reasons, [the nonmoving party] cannot present facts essential to justify its
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opposition," it must so show "by affidavit or declaration" in order for the court to defer
· its consideration of the motion or to allow time for additional discovery. Utah R. Civ. P.
56(d). Dr. Levitt did not challenge whether the Motion for Summary Judgment was
timely or claim that her lack of discovery had rendered her unable to present facts
essential to justify her opposition to the Motion. She cannot on appeal claim she is
entitled to more discovery.
Based on these uncontroverted facts, the SLRMC Parties' Motion for Summary
Judgment was properly before the district court and properly granted. During the
discovery period, the district court-granted extension, and the stipulated extension, Dr.
Levitt failed to find any evidence that would controvert the SLRMC Parties' sworn
testimony or support Dr. Levitt's conclusory allegations of bad faith or malice.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's Order
granting the SLRMC Parties' Motion for Summary Judgment.

DATED this 24th day of September, 2018.

RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.

Jonathan A. Dibble
Elaina M. Maragakis
Erin M. Adams
Attorneys for Appellees
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Utah Code

~

58-13-4 Liability immunity for health care providers on committees -- Evaluating and
approving medical care.
(1) As used in this section, "health care provider" has the same meaning as in Section 78B-3-403.
(2) Health care providers serving in the following capacities and the organizations or entities
sponsoring these activities are immune from liability with respect to deliberations, decisions, or
determinations made or information furnished in good faith and without malice:
(a) serving on c;ommittees:
(i) established to determine if hospitals and long-term care facilities are being used properly;
(ii) established to evaluate and improve the quality of health care or determine whether
provided health care was necessary, appropriate, properly performed, or provided at a
reasonable cost;
(iii) functioning under Pub. L. No. 89-97 or as professional standards review organizations
.
under Pub. L. No. 92-603;
(iv) that are ethical standards review committees; or
(v) that are similar to committees listed in ·this Subsection (2) and that are established· by any
hospital, professional association, the Utah Medical Association, or one of its component
medical societies to evaluate or review the diagnosis or treatment of, or the performance of
health or hospital services to, patients within this state;
(b) members of licensing boards established under Title 58, Occupations and Professions, to
license and regulate health care providers; and
(c) health care providers or other persons furnishing information to those committees, as required
by law, voluntarily, or upon official request.
(3) This section does not relieve any health care provider from liability incurred in providing
professional care and treatment to any patient.
(4) Health care providers serving on committees or providing information described in this section
are presumed to have acted in good faith and without malice, absent clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session

Page 1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AddendumB

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Utah Code

26-25-1 Authority to provide data on treatment and condition of persons to designated
agencies -- Immunity from liability.
(1) Any person, health facility, or other organization may, without incurring liability, provide the
following information to the persons and entities described in Subsection (2):
(a) information as determined by the state registrar of vital records appointed under Title 26,
Chapter 2, Utah Vital Statistics Act;
(b) interviews;
(c) reports;
(d) statements;
(e) memoranda;
(f) familial information; and
(g) other data relating to the condition and treatment of any person.
(2) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided to:
(a) the department and local health departments;
(b) the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health within the Department of Human
Services;
(c) scientific and health care research organizations affiliated with institutions of higher education;
(d) the Utah Medical Association or any of its allied medical societies;
(e) peer review committees;
(f) professional review organizations;
(g) professional societies and associations; and
(h) any health facility's in-house staff committee for the uses described in Subsection (3).
(3) The information described in Subsection (1) may be provided for the following purposes:
(a) study and advancing medical research, with the purpose of reducing the incidence of disease,
morbidity, or mortality; or
(b) the evaluation and improvement of hospital and health care rendered by hospitals, health
facilities, or health care providers.
(4) Any person may, without incurring liability, provide information, interviews, reports, statements,
memoranda, or other information relating to the ethical conduct of any health care provider
to peer review committees, professional societies and associations, or any in-hospital staff
committee to be used for purposes of intraprofessional society or association discipline.
(5) No liability may arise against any person or organization as a result of:
(a) providing information or material authorized in this section;
(b) releasing or publishing findings and conclusions of groups referred to in this section to
advance health research and health education; or
(c) releasing or publishing a summary of these studies in accordance ~ith this chapter.
(6) As used in this chapter:
(a) "health care provider11 has the meaning set forth in Section 788-3-403; and
(b) "health care facility" has the meaning set forth in Section 26-21-2.
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session
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Utah Code

26-25-3 Information considered privileged communications.
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data furnished by
reason of this chapter, and any findings or conclusions resulting from those studies are privileged
communications and are npt subject to discovery, use, or receipt in evidence in any legal
proceeding of any kind or character.
Amended by Chapter 201, 19.96 General Session
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Rule 26. General provisions governing disclosure and discovery.
{a) Disclosure. This rule applies unless changed or supplemented by a rule governing disclosure and discovery in a
practice area.
(a)(1) Initial disclosures. Except in cases exempt under paragraph (a)(3), a party shall, without waiting for a
discovery request, serve on the other parties:

{a)(1 )(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of:
(a)(1 )(A)(i) each individual likely to have (iiscoverable Information supporting its claims or defenses, unless
solely for Impeachment, identifying the subjects of the information; and
(a)(1 )(A)(il) each fact witness the party may call in its case-in-chief and, except for an adverse party, a ·
summary of the expected testimony;
(a)(1)(B) a copy of all documents, data compilations, electronically stored information, and tangible things in
the possession or control of the party that the party may offer in its case-in-chief, except charts, summaries and
demonstrative exhibits that have not yet been prepared and must be disclosed in accordance with paragraph (a)
(5);

(a)(1 )(C) a computation of any damages claimed and a copy of all discoverable documents or evidentiary
material on which such computation is based, including materials about the nature and extent of injuries suffered;

~

(a)(1 )(D) a copy of any agreement under which any person may be liable to satisfy part or all of a judgment or
to indemnify or reimburse for payments made to satisfy the judgment; and
(a)(1 )(E) a copy of all documents to which a party refers in its pleadings.

GD

{a)(2) Timing of Initial disclosures. The disclosures required by paragraph (a)(1) shall be served on the other
parties:
(a)(2)(A) by the plaintiff within 14 days after filing of the first answer to the complaint; and
(a)(2)(B) by the defendant within 42 days after filing of the first answer fo the complaint or within 28 days after
that defendant's appearance, whichever is later.
(a){3) Exemptions.

(a)(3)(A) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed to by the parties, the requirements of paragraph (a)
(1) do not apply to actions:
(a)(3)(A)(i) for judicial review of adjudicative proceedings or rule making proceedings of an administrative
agency;

@

(a)(3){A)(ii) governed by Rule 658 or Rule 65C:
(a)(3)(A)(iii) to enforce an arbitration award;
(a)(3}(A)(iv) for water rights general adjudication under Title 73, ChaP-ter 4, Determination of Water Rights.
(a)(3)(B) In an exempt action, the matters subject to disclosure under paragraph (a)(1) are subject to discovery
under paragraph (b).

Ci)

(a)(4) Expert testimony.

{a){4}(A) Disclosure of expert testimony. A party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the
other parties the following information regarding any person who may be used at trial to present evidence under
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence and who is retained or specially employed to provide expert testimony In
the case or whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve giving expert testimony: (i) the.expert's
name and qualifications, including a list of all publications authored within the preceding 10 years, and a list of any
other cases in which the expert has testified as an expert at trial or by deposition within the preceding four years,
(ii) a brief summary of the opinions to which the witness is expected to testify, (iii) all data and other information
that will be relied upon by the witness in forming those opinions, and (iv) the compensation to be paid for the
witness's study and testimony.
(a)(4)(B) Limits on expert discovery. Further discovery may be obtained from an expert witness either by
deposition or by written report. A deposition shall not exceed four hours and the party taking the _deposition shall
pay the expert's reasonable hourly fees for attendance at the deposition. A report shall be signed by the expert
and shall contain a complete statement of all opinions the expert will offer at trial and the basis and reasons for
http:l/www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp026.html
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them. Such an expert may not testify in a party's case-in-chief concerning any matter not fairly disclosed in the
report. The party offering the expert shall pay the costs for the report.
(a)(4)(C) Timing for expert discovery.

(a)(4 )(C)(i) The party who bears the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is offered
shall serve on the other parties the information required by paragraph (a)(4)(A) within seven days after the
close of fact discovery. Within seven days thereafter, the party opposing the expert may serve notice electing
either a deposition of the expert pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report pursuant to
paragraph (a)(4)(8). The deposition shall occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties, within 28
days after the election is served on the other parties. If no election is served on the other parties, then no
further discovery of the expert shall be permitted.
(a)(4)(C)(li) The party who does not bear the burden of proof on the issue for which expert testimony is
offered shall serve on the other parties the information required by paragraph (a)(4){A) within seven days after
the later of (A) the date on which the election under paragraph (a)(4)(C)(i) is due, or (8) receipt of the written
report or the taking of the expert's deposition pursuant to paragraph (a){4)(C)(i). Within seven days thereafter,
the party opposing the expert may serve notice electing either a deposition of the expert pursuant to
paragraph (a)(4)(B) and Rule 30, or a written report pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(8). The deposition shall
occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties, within 28 days after the election is served on the other
parties. If no election is served on the other parties, then no further discovery of the expert shall be permitted.
(a)(4 )(C)(iii) If the party who bears the burden of proof on an issue wants to designate rebuttal expert
witnesses it shall serve on the other parties the information required by paragraph (a)(4 )(A) within s~ven days
after the later of (A) the date on which the election under paragraph (a)(4)(C)(ii) is due, or (B) receipt of the
written report or the taking of the expert's deposition pursuant to paragraph (a)(4 )(C)(ii). Within seven days
thereafter, the party opposing the expert may serve notice electing either a deposition of the expert pursuant to
paragraph (a)(4)(8) and Rule 30, or a written report pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(8). The deposition shall
occur, or the report shall be served on the other parties, within 28 days after the election is served on the other
parties. If no election is served on the other parties, then no further discovery of t~e expert shall be permitted.
(a)(4)(D) Multiparty actions. In multiparty actions, all parties opposing the expert must agree on either a
report or a deposition. If all parties opposing the expert do not agree, then further discovery of the expert may be
obtained only by deposition pursuant to paragraph (a)(4)(8) and Rule 30.

(a)(4)(E) St:1mmary of non-retained expert testimony. If a party Intends to present evidence at trial. under
Rule 702 of the Utah Rules of Evidence from any person other than an expert witness who is retained or specially
employed to provide testimony in the case or a person whose duties as an employee of the party regularly involve
giving expert testimony, that party must serve on the other parties a written summary of the facts and opinions to
which the witness is expected to testify in accordance with the deadlines set forth in paragraph (a)(4)(C). A
deposition of such a witness may not exceed four hours.
(a)(5) Pretrial disclosures.

(a)(5)(A) A party shall, without waiting for a discovery request, serve on the other parties:
(a)(5)(A)(i) the name and, If not previously provided, the address and telephone number of each witness,
unless solely for impeachment, separately identifying witnesses the party will call and witnesses the party may
call;
(a)(5)(A)(ii) the name of witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by transcript of a
deposition and a copy of the transcript with the proposed testimony designated; and
(a){S}(A){iil) a copy of each exhibit, including charts, summaries and demonstrative exhibits, unless solely
for impeachment, separately identifying those which the party will offer and those which the party may offer.
(a)(5)(B) Disclosure re.quired by paragraph (a)(5) shall be served on the other parties at least 28 days before
trial. At least 14 days before trial, a party shall serve and file counter designations of deposition testimony,
objections and grounds for the objections to the use of a deposition and to the admissibility of exhibits. Other than
objections under Rules 402 and 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, objections not listed are waived unless
excused by the court for good cause.
(b) Discovery scope.
(b)(1) In general. Parties may discover any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the claim or defense of any
party if the discovery ·satisfies the standards of proportionality set forth below. Privileged matters that are not
discoverable or admissible In any proceeding of any kind or character Include all information in any form provided
during and created specifically as part of a request for an investigation, the investigation, findings, or conclusions of
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp026.html
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peer review, care review, or quality assurance processes of any organization of health care providers as defined In the
Utah Health Care MalP.ractice Act for the purpose of evaluating care provided to reduce morbidity and mortality or to
improve the quality of medical care, or for the purpose of peer review of the ethics, competence! or professional
conduct of any health care provider.

<iv

(b)(2) Proportionality. Discovery and discovery requests are proportional if:

(b)(2)(A) the discovery is reasonable 1 considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
complexity of the case 1 the parties' resources, the importance of the issues, and the Importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues;
(b )(2)(8) the likely benefits of the proposed discovery outweigh the burden or expense;
(b )(2)(C) the discovery is consistent with the overall case management and will further the just, speedy and
Inexpensive determination of the case;
(b)(2)(D) the discovery is not unreasonably cumulative or duplicative;
(b)(2)(E) the information cannot be obtained from another source th~t is more convenient, less burdensome or
less expensive; and
·
(b )(2)(F) the party seeking discovery has not had sufficient opportunity to obtain the information by discovery
or otherwise, taking into account the parties' relative access to the Information.
(b)(3) Burden. The party seeking discovery always has the burden of showing proportionality and relevance. To
ensure proportionality, the court may enter orders under Rule ~(b)(4) Electronically stored information. A party claiming that electronically stored information Is not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost shall describe the source of the electronically stored information, the
nature and extent of the burden, the nature of the Information not provided, and any other information that will enable
other parties to evaluate the claim.
(b)(5) Trial preparation materials. A party may obtain otherwise discoverable documents and tangible things
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representative
(including the party's attorney, consultant, surety, indemnltor, insurer, or agent) only upon a showing that the party
seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain
substantially equivalent materials by other means. In ordering discovery of such materials, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other
representative of a party.
(b)(6) Statement previously made about the action. A party may obtain without the showing required in
paragraph (b)(5) a statement concerning the action or its subject matter previously made by that party. Upon request, a
person not a party may obtain without the required showing a statement about the action or its subject matter
previously made by that person. If the request is refused, the person may move for a court order under Rule 37. A
statement previously made is (A) a written statement signed or approved by the person making it, or (B) a
stenographic, mechanical, electronic, or other recording, or a transcription thereof, which is a substantially verbatim
recital of an oral statement by the person making it and contemporaneously recorded.
(b)(7) Trial preparation; experts.
(b)(7)(A) TriaJ ..preparation protection for draft reports or disclosures. Paragraph (b)(5) protects drafts of
any report or disclosure required under paragraph (a)(4 ), regardless of the form in which the draft is recorded.
(b)(7)(B) TriaJ..preparation protection for communications between a party's attorney and expert
witnesses. Paragraph (b)(5) protects communications between the party's attorney and any witness required to

provide disclosures under paragraph (a)(4), regardless of the form of the communications, except to the extent
that the communications:
(b)(7)(B)(i) relate to compensation for the expert's study or testimony;
(b)(7)(B){ii) identify facts or data that the party's attorney provided and that the expert considered in
forming the opinions to be expressed; or
(b)(7)(B)(iii) identify assumptions that the party's attorney provided and that the expert relied on in forming
the opinions to be expressed.

Qi)

(b){7)(C) Expert employed only for trial preparation. Ordinarily, a party may not, by Interrogatories or
otherwise, discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained or specially employed by
another party in anticipation of li~igatlon or to prepare for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at
trial. A party may do so only:
http://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp026.html
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(b )(7)(C)(i) as prpvided in Rule 35(t2); or
(b)(7)(C)(ii} on showing exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party to obtain
facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
·
(b)(8) Claims of privilege or protection of trial preparation materials.

(b}(S){A) Information withheld. If a party withholds discoverable information by claiming that it is privileged or
prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the
nature of the documents, communications, or things not produced in a manner that, without revealing the
in.formation itself, will enable other parties to evaluate the claim.
(b)(S)(B) Information produced. If a party produces information that the party claims is privileged or prepared
in anticipation of litigation or for trial, the producing party may notify any receiving party of the claim and the basis
for it. After being notified, a receiving party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the specified information
and any copies it has and may not use or disclose the information until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may
promptly present the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. If the receiving party
disclosed the information before being notified, it must take reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party
must preserve the information until the claim is resolved.

I~,;?,

~

(c) Methods, sequence and timing of discovery; tiers; limits on standard discovery; extraordinary discovery.
(c)(1) Methods of discovery. Parties may obtain discovery by one or more of the following methods: depositions
upon oral examination or written questions; written interrogatories; production of documents or things or permission to
enter upon land or other property, for inspection and other purposes; physical and mental examinations; requests for
admission; and subpoenas other than for a court hearing or trial.

(ij

(c)(2) Sequence and timing of discovery. Methods of discovery may be used in any sequence, and the fact that
a party is conducting discovery shall not delay any other party's discovery. Except for cases exempt under paragraph

(a}(3), a party may not seek discovery from any source before that party's initial disclosure obligations are satisfied.
(c)(3) Definition of tiers for standard discovery. Actions claiming $50,000 or less in damages are permitted
standard discovery as described for Tier 1. Actions claiming more than $50,000 and less than $300,000 in damages
are permitted standard discovery as described for Tier 2. Actions claiming $300,000 or more in ·damages are permitted
standard discovery as described for Tier 3. Absent an accompanying damage claim for more than $300,000, actions
claiming non-monetary rellef are permitted standard discovery as described for Tier 2.
(c)(4) Definition of damages. For purposes of determining standard discovery, the amount of damages includes
the total of all monetary damages sought (without duplication for alternative theories} by all parties in all claims for
relief in the original pleadings.
(c)(S) Limits on standard fact discovery. Standard fact discovery per side (plaintiffs collectively, defendants
collectively, and third•party defendants collectively) In each tier is as follows. The days to complete standard fact
discovery are calculated from the date the first defendant's first disclosure is due and do not include expert discovery
under paragraphs(a)(4)(C) and (D).

Total
Fact
Deposition
Hours

Rule 34
Requests·
for
Production

Rule 33
Interrogatories
including all
discrete subparts

Rule 36
Requests
for
Admission

Days to
Complete
Standard Fact
Discovery

Tier

Amount of Damages

1

$50,000 or less

3

0

5

5

120

2

More ·than $50,000
and less than $300,000
or non-monetary relief

15

10

10

10

180

30

20

20

20

210

$300,000 or more

3

(c)(6) Extraordinary discovery. To obtain discovery beyond the limits established in paragraph (c)(5), a party

shall file:

·

(c)(6)(A) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits of standard discovery imposed by
these rules, a stipulated statement that extraordinary discovery is.necessary and proportional under paragraph (b)
(2) and that each party has reviewed and approved a discovery budget; or
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(c)(6}(B) before the close of standard discovery and after reaching the limits of standard discovery imposed by
these rules, a request for extraordinary discovery under Rule 37(9 )..

(d) Requirements for disclosure or response; disclosure or response by an organization; failure to disclose;
initial and supplemental disclosures and responses.
(d)(1) A party shall make disclosures and responses to discovery based on the information then known or
reasonably available to the party.
(d)(2) If the party providing disclosure or responding to discovery is a corporation, partnership, association, or
governmental agency, the party shall act through one or more officers, directors, managing agents, or other persons,
who shall make disclosures and responses to discovery based on the information then known or reasonably available
to the party.
(d)(3) A party is not excused from making disclosures or responses because the party has not completed
investigating the case or because the party challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or responses or
because another party has not made disclosures or responses.
(d)(4) If a party fails to disclose or to supplement timely a disclosure or response to discovery, that party may not
use the undisclosed witness, document or material at any hearing or trial unless the failure is harmless or the party
shows good cause for the failure.
(d)(5) If a party learns that a disclosure or response is incomplete or Incorrect in some important way, the party
must timely serve on the other parties the additional or correct information if It has not been made known to the other
parties. The supplemental disclosure or response must state why the additional or correct information was not
previously provided.
(e) Signing discovery requests, responses, and objections. Every disclosure, request for discovery, response to a
request for discovery and objection to a request for discovery shall be in writing and signed by at least one attorney of
record or by the party if the party is not represented. The signature of the attorney or party is a certification under Rule 11.
If a request or response is not signed, the receiving party does not need to take any action with respect to it. If a
certification is made in violation of the rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, may take any action
authorized by Rule 11 or Rule 37(Q)..

;(;;,
V

(f) Filing. Except as required by these rules or ordered by the court, a party shall not file with the court a disclosure, a
request for discovery or a response to a request for discovery, but shall file only the certificate of service stating that the
disclosure, request for discovery or response has been served on the other parties and the date of service.
Advisory Committee Notes
Legislative Note

Gi)
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Rule 56. Summary judgment.
(a) Motion for summary Judgment or partial summary Judgment. A. party may move for summary judgment.
identifying each claim or defense-or the part of each claim or defense-on which summary judgment is sought. The court
shall grant summary judgment if the moving party shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court should state on the record the reasons for granting or
denying the motion. The motion and memoranda must follow Rule I as supplemented below.

z.

(a)(1) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule a motion for summary judgment must contain a statement
of material facts claimed not to be genuinely disputed. Each fact must be separately stated in numbered paragraphs
and supported by citing to materials in the record under paragraph (c)(1) of this rule.
(a)(2) Instead of a statement of the facts under Rule Z, a memorandum opposing the motion must include a
verbatim restatement of each of the moving party's facts that Is disputed with an explanation of the grounds for the
dispute supported by citing to materials in the record under paragraph (c)(1) of this rule. The memorandum may
contain a separate statement of additional materials facts in dispute. which must be separately stated in numbered
paragraphs and similarly supported.
(a)(3) The motion and the memorandum opposing the motion may contain a concise statement of facts, whether
disputed or undisputed, for the limited purpose of providing background and context for the case, dispute and motion.
(a)(4). Each material fact set forth in the motion or in the memorandum opposing the motion under paragraphs (a)
(1) and {a)(2) that Is not disputed is deemed admitted for the purposes of the motion.
(b) Time to file a motion. A party seeking to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim or to obtain a
declaratory judgment may move for summary judgment at any time after service of a motion for summary Judgment by the
adverse party or after 21 days from the commencement of the action. A party against whom a claim. counterclaim, or
cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory Judgment Is sought may move for summary judgment at any time. Unless the court
orders otherwise, a party may file a motion for summary judgment at any time no later than 28 days after the close of all
discovery.
(c) Procedures.
{c)(1) Supporting factual positions.A party asserting that a fact cannot be genuinely disputed or is genuinely
disputed must support the assertion by:
·

(c)(1 )(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents. electronically
stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only),
admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(c)(1 )(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute.
(c)(2) Objection that a fact is not supported by admissible evidence. A party may object that the material cited
to support or dispute a fact cannot be presented in a form that would be admissible in evidence.
(c)(3) Materials not cited. The court need consider only the cited materials, but it may consider other materials in
the record.
(c)(4) Affidavits or declarations. An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a motion must be made on
personal knowledge, must set out facts that would be admissible in evidence, and must show that the affiant or
declarant Is competent to testify on the matters stated.
(d) When facts are unavailable to the non moving party. If a nonmoving party shows by affidavit or declaration that.
for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition, the court may:

(d)(1) defer considering the motion or deny it without prejudice;
(d)(2) allow time to obtain affidavits or declarations or to take discoyery; or
(d)(3) issue any other appropriate order.
(e) Falling to properly support or address a fact. If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to
properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by paragraph (c). the court may:

@

(e)(1) give an opportunity to properly support or address the fact;
{e)(2) consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion;
(e)(3) grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials-including the facts considered undisputed
-show that the moving party is entitled to it; or
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/urcp/urcp056.htm1
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(e)(4) issue any other appropriate order.

(f) Judgment Independent of the motion. After giving notice and a reasonable time to respond, the court may:
{f){1) grant summary judgment for a nonmoving party;
(f)(2) grant the motion on grounds not raised by a party; or

~

(f)(3) consider summary judgment on its own after identifying for the parties material facts that may not be
genuinely in dispute.
(g) Failing to grant all the requested relief. If the court does not grant all the .relief requested by the motion, it may
enter an order stating any material fact-including an item of damages or other relief-that is not genuinely in dispute and
treating the fact as established in the case.
(h) Affidavit or declaration submitted in bad faith. If satisfied that an affidavit or declaration under this rule is
submitted in bad faith or solely for delay, the court-after riotice and a reasonable time to respond-may order the
submitting party to pay the other party the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, It Incurred as a result. The court
may also hold an offending party or attorney in contempt or order other appropriate sanctions.
Advisory: Committee Notes
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Rule 510. Miscellaneous Matters.

'

(a)
Waiver of Privilege. A person who holds a privilege under these rules waives the privilege if
the person or previous holder of the privilege:

a

~

(1) voluntarily discloses or consents to the disclosure of any significant part of the matter or
communication, or
(2) fails to take reasonable precautions against inadvertent disclosure.
This privilege is not waived if the disclosure is itself a privileged communication.

(b) · Inadmissibility of Disclosed Information. Evidence of a statement or other disclosure of
privileged matter is not admissible against the holder of the privilege if disclosure was compelled
erroneously or made without opportunity to claim the privilege.

1

iji

(c)
Comment or Inference Not Permitted. The claim of privilege, whether in the present
proceeding or upon a prior occasion, is not a proper subject of comment by judge or counsel. No
inference may be drawn from any claim of privilege.
~

{d)
Claiming Privilege Without the Jury's Knowledge. To the extent practicable, jury cases shall
be conducted to allow claims of privilege to be made without the jury's knowledge.
(e)
Jury Instruction. Upon request, any party against whom the jury might draw an adverse
inference from the claim of privilege is entitled to a jury instructron that no inference may be drawn
from that claim of privilege.
(f)
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination in Civil Cases. In a civil case, the provisions of
paragraph (c)-(e) do not apply when the privilege against self-incrimination has been invoked.
i)

2011 Advisory Committee Note. - The language of this rule has been amended as part of the
restyling of the Evidence Rules to make them more easily understood and to make style and
terminology consistent throughout the rules. These changes are intended to be stylistic only. There is
no intent to change any result in any ruling on evidence admissibility.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTE
The subject matter of Rule 510 was previously included in Utah Rules of Evidence 37, 38, 39 and 40.
The language recommended by the Committee, however, is largely that of proposed Federal Rules
511, 512 and 513, rules not included among those a~fopted by Congress.

io

Proposed Federal Rule 511 became Rule 510(a), replacing Rule 37. Proposed Federal Rule 512
became Rule 510(b), replacing Rule 38. Proposed Federal Rule 513 became Rule 510(c), replacing
Rule 39. No replacement was adopted for Rule 40 since the Committee determined that the subject
matter of that rule need not be covered by a rule of evidence.
·

~

Subparagraph (a). Since the purpose of evidentiary privileges is the protection of some societal
interest or confidential relationship, the privilege should end when the purpose is no longer served
because the holder of the privilege has allowed disclosure or made disclosure. For the same reason,
although Rule 37 required a knowing waiver of the privilege, Rule 51 0(a) as drafted does not require
https://www.utcourts.gov/resources/rules/ure/051
O.htm
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such knowledge. A stranger to the communication may testify to an othetwise privileged
communication, if the participants have failed to take reasonable precautions to preserve privacy.
Subparagraph (b). Once disclosure of privileged matter has occurred, although confidentiality cannot
be restored, the purpose of the privilege may still be served in some instances by preventing t,.1se of
the evidence against the holder of the privilege. For that reason, privileged matter may still be
excluded when the disclosure was not voluntary or was made without an opportunity to claim the
privilege.

01

Subparagraph (c).
(1) Allowing inferences to be drawn from the invocation of a privilege might undermine the interest or
relationship the privilege was designed to protect.

@

(2) For the same reason, the invocation of a privilege should not be revealed to the jury. Doing so
might also result in unwarranted emphasis on the exclusion of the privileged matter.
(3) Whether to seek an instruction is left to the judgment of counsel for the party against whom the
inference might be drawn. If requested, such an instruction is a matter of right.
(4) The provisions of subparagraph (c)(4) are not intended to alter the common law rules as to
inferences that may be drawn or as to when a party may comment or be entitled to a jury instruction
when the privilege. has been invoked.

~
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Jonathan A. Dibble (0881)
Elaina M. Maragakis (7929)
Erin M. Adams (15979)

& NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
Fax: (801) 532-7543
idibble@rqn.com
emaragakis@rgn.com
eadams@rgn.com
RAY QUINNEY

Attorneys for Defendants IASIS Healthcare Holdings, Inc., Salt Lake Regional Medical Center,
Alan Davis, MD. and Wanda Updike, MD.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JODIE K. LEVITT, M.D.,
Plaintiff,

v.

ORDER
Case No. 160900952

IASIS HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS, INC., a
Delaware Corporation; SALT LAKE REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, LP, a Delaware Limited
Partnership, DBA Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center; ALAN DA VIS, M.D., WANDA UPDIKE,
M.S.; and DOES 1-10,

Judge Andrew·H. Stone
Tier III

Defendants.

The Court, having reviewed the Motion for Summary Judgment (the "Motion") submitted
by Defendants IASIS Healthcare, Salt Lake Regional Medical Center, Alan Davis, M.D. and
Wanda Updike, M.D. (collectively, the "Defendants"), the Defendants' Memorandum in Support
· of the Motion for Summary Judgment, the Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion
for Summary Judgment, and Plaintiffs Declaration, and the Defendants' Reply Memorandum in
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Support of the Motion for Summary Judgment and all exhibits attached to all the papers filed and
having heard oral argument by all parties on February 7, 2018, and being fully informed, hereby
GRANTS the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on all of PlaintiWs claims, and finds
as follows:
1.

Defendants have properly invoked the peer and care review privileges.

2.

There is no evidence that Defendants acted from any motive other than healthcare

quality improvement and concern for patient care.

3.

Plaintiff has failed to rebut the presumption of good faith and lack of malice under

Utah Code Ann. §58-13-4.
4.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants are immune from Plaintiffs claims.

5.

All of Plaintiffs claims are dismissed in their entirety, with prejudice.

*

*

*

END OF ORDER

*

*

*

**In accordance with URCP Rule IO(e) and the Utah State District courts E-filing Standard No. 4,
this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of the Judge, but instead displays an electronic
signature at the upper right-hand corner of the first page of this Order.**

~

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 20, 2018, I emailed the foregoing [Proposed] Order to:
Cecil R. Hedger, Esq.
chedger@tessorolaw.com
Attorney for Plaintiff
~

Whereas Plaintiff gave no response and made no objection within seven days, we now file the
foregoing [Proposed] Order pursuant to Rule 7G)(S)(B) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
Isl Erin M Adams
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THIRD JUDICIAL DIS'IRICT COURT
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)
)

JODIE K. LEVITT, MD,

)

)
)

PLAINTIFF,

) Case No. 160900952

vs.

)

) Transcript of:
IASIS HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS INC. ,

)

) MOTION HEARING
DEFENDANT.
________________

)
)
)

BEFORE THE HONORABLE ANDREW H. STONE

SCO'IT M. MATHESON COURTHOUSE
450 SOUTH STATE.STREET
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111

FEBRUARY 7, 2018

TRANSCRIBED BY:

Katie A. Hannon, RPR, CSR
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APPEARANCES

1
2
3

4

FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
Cecil R. Hedger
Attorney at Law
1052 East South Union Ave.
Midvale, Utah 84047

5

FOR THE DEFENDANT:
6

Elaina M. Maragakis
7

Jonathan A. Dibble
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER

8

36 South State Street, #1400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

9

10
11

12
13
14
15

16
17

18
19
20

21
22
23

24

25
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1

February 7, 2018

2

PROCEEDINGS

3

* * *

4

5

THE COURT:

All right.

Good afternoon.

No. 160900952, Levitt v. Iasis Healthcare Holdings, Inc.

6

Could I have appearances, please.

7

MR. HEDGER:

8
9

This is Case

Cecil Hedger, Your Honor, for plaintiff.

Plaintiff is also with me at counsel table.
MR. DIBBLE:

Your Honor, Jonathan Dibble,

10

Elaina Maragakis, and Erin Adams representing Iasis, Salt Lake

11

Regional Medical Center, Dr. Alan Davis, and Dr. Wanda Updike.

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

We're here today on defendants'

13

motion for summary judgment, and then a motion regarding

14

extension of discovery as well.

15

MR. DIBBLE:

Is that correct?

That's correct, Your Honor.

And our

16

thought was that you may want to hear the motion for summary

17

judgment first because that may dispose of the other, possibly.

18
19

THE COURT:

I think that's correct.

the motion for summary j~dgment for starters.

20

MS. MARAGAKIS:

21

you again for your time.

22

THE COURT:

Good afternoon, Your Honor.

Well, shoot.

I should also apologize to

everyone for having to bump this hearing too.

24

unfortunately, had double-booked at .one point.
MS. MARAGAKIS:

We thank

I know, Your Honor

23

25

So let's hear

I,

Well, I would think you would be able
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1

to do two things at once.

2

I know you've reviewed the briefing and we were here not too

3

long ago, so I don't want to belabor things about which the

4

Court is very aware.

5

But we do appreciate your time, and

As Your Honor knows, we have -- from reviewing the

6

briefs, we've moved for summary judgment on all of the

7

remaining claims on a number of points, but I think it's

8

important to focus on one issue in particular and that's the

9

issue of immunity because that will encompass many of the other

10

basis for summary judgment, and it also covers both state and

11

federal and immunity as well as the contractional immunity.

12
13

So with Your Honor's permission, I would like to just
hand out a folder that I've prepared.
Yea, I appreciate that.

14

THE COURT:

15

MS. MARAGAKIS:

So, Your Honor, I want to start with

16

the issue of immunity under the -- what I will call the Utah

17

Immunity Act, and that's reproduced here under Tab 1, just to

18

make it easy to reference.

19

It provides healthcare providers serving in the following

20

capacities in the organizations or entities sponsoring these

21

activities are immune from liability with respect to

22

deliberations, decisions, or determinations made or information

23

furnished in good faith and.without malice.

24

25

And that's a very broad statute.

And below there you can see the capacities in which
they are immune.

I think it's also important to note that Utah
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1

Code annotated 58-13-4 provides that healthcare providers

2

serving on co~mittees or providing information described in

3

this section are presumed to have acted in good faith and

4

without malice absent clear and convincing evidence to the

5

contrary.
So two things are important about that.

6

First, there

7

is a presumption of immunity.

8

to be overcome by clear and convincing evidence.

9

last before Your Honor, we discussed whether the clear and

10

convincing evidence standard could be applied or should be

11

applied on summary judgment.

12

cited a number of cases discussing that that is the burden at

13

trial and should therefore also be the·burden on summary

14

judgment.

15

And second, that presumption has
When we were

And in our papers, Your Honor, we

So, again, we're here to focus on the language that

16

discusses good faith and without malice.

17

the second page of that tab -- again, all of this is in our

18

briefing, but we've compiled it here.

19

undisputed facts that establish both from an objective point of

20

view, as well as a subjective point of view, that there was no

21

malice and no bad faith.

22

And if you look at

There are a number of

And the first is, as Your Honor will recall, when we

23

were last here, you indicated that malice was a state of mind

24

and with that in mind, Your Honor, although there certainly is

25

a great deal of case law defining malice, we also recognize
Noteworthy Reporting
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1

that it could be interpreted as a state of mind and toward that

2

end, we've submitted the declarations of two of the defendants,

3

Dr. Alan Davis and Dr. Wanda Updike, as well as the declaration

4

of the then CEO, Jeff Franzen, all of whom have indicated that

5

their only motivation in issuing the suspension and taking any

6

prior or subsequent action that effected Dr. Levitt was to

7

protect patients.

8

you have.

9

been no discovery or no -- at least no depositions taken in

10

So that is the first undisputed fact that

It, obviously, has not been disputed.

There has

this case.

11

The second point is we've submitted undisputed

12

evidence that there was no motive to injure.

13

did not have any motive to injure Dr. Levitt financially or

14

otherwise.

15

The defendants

And then the third point is that these actions were

16

taken in good faith and without malice.

17

declarations that establish that all these actions were taken

18

in good faith and without malice.

19

is interpreted as a state of mind, we've submitted unrebutted

20

and really unrebuttable evidence of this objective intent being

21

in good faith and without malice.

22

Again, the three

So to the extent that malice

In addition to that, Your Honor, there is a bevy of

23

other items that demonstrate the·existence of .good faith and

24

the absence of malice.

25

we've indicated in the past, regardless of whether they were

And the first is that at some point, as
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1

reviewed internally~ they were all -- I believe 10 cases were

2

all sent for external peer review by neurosurgeons who were

3

board-certified neurologists with fellowships in spinal

4

surgery.

s

some sort of ulterior motive, all of those cases were

6

ultimately reviewed by unaffiliated neurosurgeons.

So to the extent that this could be viewed as having

The second point is you can see through a series of

7

8

correspondence that there were, in fact, a number of

9

document -- documented instances in which the concern for

10

patient care was very clearly articulated.

In the November 23,

11

2011, .letter, Dr. Levitt -- it indicated that Dr. Levitt had a

12

list of peer view cases which she said apparently led to her

13

suspension and there were even more peer reviews pending.

14

That's in the complaint.

15

quoted there saying that Dr. Levitt had several peer reviews

16

pending.

The same note -- the language is

17

Again, it also requested further clarification on her

18

hospitalization in the last five years and medications that she

19

may be taking that affect her clinical judgment or motor

20

skills.

21

she told the CEO and that should have discharged her obligation

22

to provide all of that information.

23

Your Honor, is, you know, leadership changes, members of the

24

credentialing committee change and it's important that we have

25

consistent written updated information for future review.

And the importance of this, Your.Honor, is she claims
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1

The other point, Your Honor, is that with respect to

2

the request for further information, we wanted to make sure we

3

had updated information.

4

of years old, well, we needed to know what the current status

5

was.

6

She complains that that was a couple

But, again, the reference to medications that might

7

affect clinical judgment or motor skills evidences the sole

8

concern being patient care.

9

articulated in the January 30, 2012, letter which indicated

That objective evidence is further

10

that Salt Lake Regional had concerns about her mental condition

11

and medications she might be taking to affect her clinical

12

judgment or motor skills.

13

Also in the January 30th letter, the credentialing

14

committee requested written responses to three very specific

15

issues, including her intentional refusal to list her

16

hospitalization.

17

in that January 30th letter and we requested additional

18

information, written resporises on those.

19

So those -- there were three issues outlined

Again, if this were some sort of effort to derail her

20

career, we certainly wouldn't have invited additional

21

information and made further inquiry.

22

Honor, Dr. Levitt has admitted that she did not include her

23

hospitalization on her application for renewal of privileges,

24

although she contends that was excused.

25

was not disclosed.
Noteworthy Reporting
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1

On February 20 --

2

MR. HEDGER:

Uh -- Counsel, I am sorry.

3

a chance to respond.

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. MARAGAKIS:

I will have

I apologize to Counsel and to the Court.
All right.

Thank you.

On February 24th there was a meeting

6

that took place and at that point it was a meeting between two

7

of the defendants, Dr. Davis, Dr. Updike, who were then the

8

current and former chairs of the medical executive committee,

9

or MEC, as well as Jeff Franzen, who was the then CEO and

10

Dr. Levitt.

And at that point, she was allowed to see what

11

Dr. Levitt characterized as a cursory list of the cases giving

12

rise to the suspension.

13

was called in to meet at that point prior to her suspension.

14

And finally, there was a list of cases provided to

And the important thing is is that she

15

her.

They contend it was after March 16, 2012, but in any

16

event, to say that there was no notice or that there -- you

17

know, she had absolutely no idea.of any of the reasons for her

18

suspension, is just belied by all of the contents of these

19

letters and the February 24th meeting as well.

20

I will also note, Your Honor, that the defendants

21

never reported Dr. Levitt to the National Practitioner

22

Databank.

23

there was no -- nothing on her NPDB record.

24

suspension was lifted upon successful completion of her

25

proctorship and so -- that's where she continues to this day.

The suspension did not last longer than 30 days, so
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1
2

So I think all of those factors, Your Honor, are

3

abundant evidence -- constitute abundant evidence of a lack of

4

bad faith and no malice as a matter of law, particularly given

5

the presumption and the clear and convincing standard.

6

~

She continues to be employed there.

I will also note to the Court, we cited the

7

Scappatura case, which is not a Utah case, but it does give a

8

definition to -- for malice in that it's a wish to vex, annoy,

9

or injure another person or an intent to do a wrongful act.

It

10·

also defined it as a prim_ary purpose other than the

11

safeguarding of patients, personal animosity, and overreaching

12

or not enough, it has to be that the primary purpose was other

13

than the safeguarding of patients.

14

alleged, Your Honor, nor has it been borne out by any of the

15

items in the record.

16

That certainly has not been

I think that the Utah -- the reason I focused on the

17

Utah statute, Your Honor, is that it's sort of the most

18

comprehensive, but I will also note for the Court that HIPAA,

19

the -- excuse me, I, like many others, am battling the cold and

20

flu season.
Tell me about it.

21

THE COURT:

22

MS. MARAGAKIS:

23

THE COURT:

24

MS. MARAGAKIS:

25

What's that?

Tell me about it.

You too?
Yeah.

Yeah.

Healthcare Quality Improvement Act

also provides for. immunity if four requires are met, that the
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1

action is taken and the reasonable belief that the action was

2

in furtherance of quality healthcare.

3

Honor, I will just submit to you the same facts that I just

4

recited to you, namely that these peer reviews were pending,

5

there were -- they were elevated at some point to outside peer

6

review and, obviously, there is an abundance of evidence that

7

there was potential -- there were potential issues that could

8

impact qual~ty healthcare.

On that point, Your

The second point is after a reasonable effort to

9

10

obtain the facts of the matter, again, we did invite additional

11

responses, which doctor -- which Dr. Levitt did provide.

12

after adequate notice hearing procedures are afforded to the

13

position involved or after such other procedures as are fair to

14

the physician under the circumstances.

15

And

This has been a bit of point of contention by the

16

plaintiff, but, Your Honor, I just underscore the fact that as

17

many of these cases -- as is the case with many of these cases,

18

it was simply resolved by the fact that she accepted and

19

completed this proctorship.

20

say, "Well, she didn't really accept it,

21·

matter is:

22

completed it and her suspension was lifted.

23

Now I know that the plaintiff will
11

but the fact of the

She did accept the proctorship because she

If there is some sort of dispute about whether that

24

was accepted, I suppose the suspension would still be in place.

25

So I don't think that there is any reasonable argument that
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1

somehow she was entitled to a fair hearing when she proceeded

2

with the option of the proctorship and I think that's important

3

to note.
I also will note, Your Honor, there has been an

4

5

allegation by the plaintiff that she was denied the opportunity

6

for a fair hearing.

7

of an email to and -- to Dr. Davis and -- from Dr. Davis and we

8

have attached it in redacted form, but I will just note, Your

9

Honor, that in that email Dr. Davis specifically talks about if

And the plaintiff actually attached a copy

10

you want to have a hearing, you are going to have to request

11

that by March -- I think it was March 16th -- it won't occur

12

prior to -- prior to the 30 days.

13

THE COURT:

Am

I correct in reading that chain that

14

there was a response from the doctor March 8th from doctor

15

[inaudible].

16

17

MS. MARAGAKIS:

issue of whether she wanted to request a fairing hearing.

18

19
20

So there was not a response on the

THE COURT:

No, it was just more thank you, as I

recall.
MS. MARAGAKIS:

Yes.

But there was never any

21

response to that, no "I want to go through with my fair

22

hearing, I want to clear my name," nothing further at least is

23

indicated by that -- by that --

24

25

THE COURT:

I'm just trying to date when the offer

for a hearing was made, and so it was made shortly before
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1

March 8th is what --

2

MS. MARAGAKIS:

3

can get that exact date.

4

Yes, that 1 s correct, Your Honor.

We

And I will also note, Your Honor, and we have cited

5

this in our papers, that there is an exception for what

6

happened here, which is a summary suspension.

7

exception in HIPAA that says, "Nothing in this section shall be

8

construed as precluding an immediate suspension or restriction

9

of clinical privileges subject to subsequent notice and hearing

10

or other adequate procedures where the failure to take any such

11

action may result in an immanent danger to the health of any

12

individual.

13

There is an

11

Your Honor, that just is sort of common sense

14

provision because the hospital has to have some means of

15

immediately suspending a physician should the care of a patient

16

be in immediate.danger and the summary suspension that was

17

taken there was subject to that standard.

18

was required or -- that she was entitled to prior notice I

19

think is defeated by that exception.

20

So the idea that she

Your Honor, as is the case Utah's Immunity Act-, there

21

is also a presumption that the foregoing standards have been

22

met, although the standard is different, it 1 s preponderance of

23

the evidence standard.

24

Finally, Your Honor there is a third basis for
~

25

immunity and that is the immunity that 1 s granted by the bylaws.
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1

Dr. Levitt's agreed through the bylaws that if granted

2

appointment -- reappointment of· clinical privileges, "I extend

3

immunity to and release from any and all liability the

4

hospital, its authorized representatives, and any third parties

5

for any acts, communications, recommendations, or disclosures

6

performed without any intentional fraud or malice involving me,

7

relating to, but not limited to the following," and then it

8

gives a list, which we have cited in our papers.

9

Now, Your Honor, the standard is $imilar, but a

10

little different here.

11

which has not been alleged in this case, or malice, which I

12

think we've previously addressed, Your Honor, the absence of

13

malice.

14

appropriate.

15

not disputed any of the materials facts that would indicate any

16

sort of malice or lack of good faith.

That talks about intentional fraud,

So for those reasons, we maintain that immunity is

17

It is abundantly shown and that Dr. Levitt has

And for that reason, we believe that the immunity

18

provision -- provisions of both federal and state law as well

19

as the bylaws apply.

20

judgment on the remaining causes of action on independent basis

21

as well.

And I know that we did address this in our prior

22

hearing.

I'm prepared to and.I'm glad to address those if the

23

Court would like me to address those, or if the Court feels it

24

would be more efficient to focus on the issue of immunity, I'~l

25

take the Court's guidance.

Your Honor, we have moved for summary

~
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THE COURT:

1

2

I will give you an opportunity afterwards

if -- I am kind of focused on the malice issue -Okay.

3

MS. MARAGAKI S :

4

THE COURT:

5

MS. MARAGAKIS:

6

I also will note, Your Honor, just for the Court's

[inaudible] disputed fact.
Thank you, Your Honor.

7

convenience, we 1 ve also attached to Tab 2 a time line that can

8

set forth some of these -- some of these issues.
MR. HEDGER:

9

Counsel, quick question.

(Conversation between counsel.)

10

MS. MARAGAKIS:

11

Mr. Hedger pointed out a typo, and I

12

do apologize to the Court for that.

13

with the CEO

14

had the 24th and I do apologize to the Court for that error,

15

but note that correction.

16

that out.

The date of the meeting

excuse me, Your Honor, was February 14th.

Cl)

I

I appreciate Mr. Hedger pointing

All right.

Mr. Hedger.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. HEDGER:

19

I, too, want to thank the Court for the Court's time.

Thank you, Your Honor.

20

I think that we need to scrutinize a couple of things.

21

was very articulate in her argument with respect to both the

22

Federal Healthcare Quality Improvement Act, which requires_a

23

preponderance of evidence concerning bad faith or malice as

24

well as the two state statutes.

25

i)

Counsel
~

However, there is a couple of things that beg the
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1

Court's attention and that is this:

2

defendants filed a reply memorandum that they started to rely

3

upon the immediate -- on the exception or the provision, I

4

should say, in the Healthcare Quality Improvement Act for an

5

immediate suspension.

6

we had filed our opposition to their motion for summary

7

judgment.

8

attached what they considered to be a privileged email and

9

redacted it to suit their purposes.

10

It was not until

And that was not thrown out there until

And for some inexplicable reason, Your Honor, they

Your Honor, the fact that they did that I think opens

11

the door, No. 1, to our ability to share with the Court the

12

entirety of that email and would ask the Court for that

13

opportunity to do that at this point.

14

THE COURT:

15

MR. HEDGER:

16

THE COURT:

17

MR. HEDGER:

18

THE COURT:

This is an email your client received?
I'm sorry?
This is an email your client received?
That is correct.
Okay.

I will receive it for purposes of

19

determining whether it's -- it's something I can consider or

20

not, but ...

21

MS. MARAGAICIS:

And, Your Honor, just for the record,

22

we would note that we redacted for purposes of preserving

23

privilege and ask the Court notice -- note that we, as the

24

defendants, are not waiving the privilege.

25

THE COURT:

All right.

I'm fine with that and I'm

Noteworthy Reporting

801.634.5549

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1

only receiving it for purposes of making that determination.

2

MR. HEDGER:

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HEDGER:

May I approach?
Yes.
I think it's important for the Court to

s

read the entirety of this email to allow the rest of my

6

argument concerning both the state's statute and the federal

7

statute with respect to what we're dealing with here.
Okay.

8

9

Your Honor, Dr. Davis indicates "it will only

count as 28 days in extending a deadline with respect to the

10

suspension," meaning that could he have, at any point in time

11

prior to my client's slip-and-fall in the operating room, which

12

caused the extension and sometime on the 4th, 5th, or 6th of

13

March, my client fell and suffered a concussion in the

14

operating room, which triggered the reference here to extending

15

this thing for another week.

16

I will have the ability this -- email says and stands

17

for, to extend or to hold or to determine when the 28 days

18

starts or counts or whatever.

19

reason:

20

to -- in February, prior to her slip-and-fall in the operation

21

room.

22

And that's important for this

It's because my client asked for a fair hearing prior

Dr. Davis told her no.
And then in his affidavit, Your Honor, that's

23

Exhibit-1 to their motion, he says that he told my client,

24

which my client denies, that if you have a fair hearing, it's

25

going to extend the suspension and cause problems with the
Noteworthy Reporting

801.634.5549

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

01236 7

~

Cid)

~

1

recording requirements for the National Practitioner's Data

2

board.

3

I have the right, I still -- I will still only count as 28

4

days."

5

But in email he says, "Don't worry about any extension,

And particularly important here, Your Honor, with

6

respect to my client's affidavit, and in opposition to the

7

motion for summary judgment, is the assertions that no one

8

bothered to tell her what the concerns were in those cases that

9

were peer reviewed.

Your Honor, we take no issue with a

10

hospital doing whatever they're going to do with respect to

11

peer review.

12

without involving the involved physician in a discussion with

13

respect to what's in that peer review or what's not in that

14

peer review, or what was the standard of care, was it breached,

15

was it not breached, et cetera.

16

We take issue with them taking unilateral action

And we take no issue with the right of a hospital to

17

issue a summary suspension.

What we take issue with, Your

18

Honor, in this case, primarily, is the fact that we asked for a

19

fair hearing, it's clearly articulated in the bylaws, and the

20

minute on the 14th of February when they had the meeting and

21

she was advised of the suspension, they had the concomitant

22

obligation under that bylaw that we -- the page of the bylaws

23

that we presented to the Court to notify her that she had the

24

right to a fair hearing at that point in time.

(ii

@

25

At the prior argument before this Court, we talked
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1

about the correspondence that I -- excuse me, received from the

2

general counsel for IASIS indicating that the hospital required

3

my client to take and complete proctored cases.

4

situation, Your Honor, where my client was asked, "Will you

5

agree to s_ome further educational process with respect to what

6

you're doing?"

7

what she was required to do with respect to those proctored

8

cases and completed approximately nine when only six or seven

9

were originally required because Dr. Davis disallowed two of

10

It was a proctoring situation.

This was not a

She completed

them without any explanation.

11

Now, a peer review and ongoing proctoring situation

12

would subsume and, I think, demonstrate that if we were

13

operating in good faith and without malice, we would be able to

14

use other facilities of IASIS to do those proctored cases, to

15

complete them on time without a major disruptio~, and would not

16

have to then go back and complete seven to nine of those

17

proctored cases, which they were never ever originally

18

contemplated.

19

my client's affidavit in our opposition to motion for summary

20

judgment.

21

And that's, I think, Your Honor, in Exhibit-3 to

I can determine the days.

The rest of that March 8th

22

email is equally instructive.

And I should preface my comments

23

with respect to telling the Court that it's undisputed that on

24

the 24th of February, Jeff Franzen shared a cursory list of

25

those peer reviewed cases with my client for about 20 seconds.
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Unanswered on the record is why would he be sharing that in

2

response to her continued questions and efforts to find out

3

what was going if, in fact, that was discussed at the

4

February 14th hearing and meeting.

5

They say they discussed concerns and that the action

6

that they implemented with the suspension was to protect

7

patients.

8

on the 14th of February was a result of some immediate patient

9

concerns.

They, in their reply brief, said that the discussion

That does not appear anywhere in any of the

10

affidavits, but-is part of their argument, and it's part of,

11

Your Honor, this shroud of what we contend to be malice, and

12

that springs from the touchstone that on the 14th of February

13

she was entitled to notice that she could request a fair

14

hearing.

15

And in terms of the malice and bad faith, if Dr.

16

Davis had the right in March to determine 28 days, as he says

17

in his email, he had the same opportunity, the same power, to

18

do the

19

hearing.

to extend it in February when we asked for the fair

~

20

Now, they say concerns and patients were discussed.

21

We say that that was not discussed and controvert that.

22

suggest, Your Honor, that if, in fact, patients were discussed,

23

concerns were discussed, why on God's green earth would

24

Dr. Davis in the second paragraph of the March 8th email say

25

that I know you want to know about the cases and the whole
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1

process and what led to your suspension.

That can only be done

2 •if you request that fair hearing and get your lawyer involved,
3

our lawyer, and the MEC.

4

"The fair hearing," he says, "could be scheduled for

5

sometime in the future, by which time you've already completed

6

the proctoring.

7

belies the argument of counsel that proctoring was the same as

8

providing my client a fair hearing.

9

an issue, Your Honor, with respect to the fair hearing, but the

11

And so that portion of the email, Your Honor,

I don't know if there is

10

fair hearing plan, the entirety of that plan appeared as

11

Exhibit-C to the motion to extend discovery that was filed in

12

early March of last year.

13

Because of a passing quip in their reply memorandum

14

that the entirety of.that fair hearing plan or the entirety of

15

the -- of all of the bylaws are not attached, I've got a copy

16

of the fair hearing plan for the Court's convenience, perusal,

17

if the Court·would be so inclined to entertain it.

18

May I approach?

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. HEDGER:

Yes.
Clearly provides a requirement that once

21

a physician is advised about an adverse action or a pending

22

adverse action, or in this case, being advised that she was

23

being suspended, that she had a right under the bylaws to

24

request a fair hearing, that was denied.

25

the denial is in neon lights and bright as day in Dr. Davis's
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affidavit when he -- he asserts that his comment about the fair

2

hearing was:

3

deadlines and you may. have to be reported.

4

Don't do it because it will extend the time for

My client is adamant that she requested the fair

5

hearing and because of this email, Your Honor, on March 8th, I

6

have copied and would be -- like to share with the Court a copy

7

of my client's request for the fair hearing dated

8

February 28th, if I may.

9

MS. MARAGAKIS:

Again, Your Honor, we would just

10

lodge the same objection that we maintain that this is part of

11

the peer review privilege documents, so subject to that

12

objection and preserving that privilege on behalf of the

13

defendants.

14

15
16

THE COURT:

All right.

Noting that objection, I will

receive it for purposes of determining its admissibility.
MR. HEDGER:

And, for the record, Your Honor at -- at

17

one point -- and I don't know if

18

record, but I would so represent to the Court that my client

19

was told to communicate concerning anything having to do with

20

this suspension through Michelle Judy which was the medical

21

staff administrator at the hospital and that's why it's

22

addressed to her.

23

I don't think it's in the

With respect to the Healthcare Quality Improvement

24

Act immunity, Your Honor, about the only thing· that we have

25

evidence or access of evidence to is paragraph 3 provision that
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1

states that after adequate notice, fair hearing procedures are

2

afforded to the physician involved or after -- or after such

3

other procedures as are fair to the physician under the

4

circumstances.

5

Here, Your Honor~ they suspended her and then after,

6

which they're arguing is fair to my client, was the idea that

7

she finish a proctoring protocol in exchange, I guess, for the

8

fair hearing to which she was entitled, to which she requested,

9

and for which the defendants denied.

And so I argue, Your

10

Honor, and point out again, it's kind of, like, the fog in the

11

morning in San Diego, nothing that you can really pinpoint your

12

fingers on, but the entire -- the entirety of this process was

13

shrouded in some kind of ambiguity and failure to communicate,

14

I think reasonably well.

15

They claim that they were concerned, Your·Honor, with

16

the fact that my client omitted her hospitalization in 2009

17

from the application for privileges she completed and submitted

18

in 2011.

19

shared with you as Exhibit-3, I think, or 4 to my client's

20

affidavit on the application itself that says that the

21

information that's required or we -- or requested, et cetera,

22

is -- it's okay to give that to the -- to the chief executive

23

officer.

24

25

She reasonably relied on the material language that's

But for purposes of this argument in this proceeding
and the way they're claiming that she intentionally tried·to
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hide something is inappropriate, I believe, to the extreme, the

2

CEO was aware of it, doctors were aware of it.

We submit that

3

both Dr. Updike and Dr. Davis were aware of it.

She provided

4

in 2009 a statement from her doctor that she was fit to go back

5

to work, that she was not taking any medication that would

6

effect motor skills or judgment.

7

In response to the January 30th letter, that they

8

needed quote, current information with respect to what they

9

already had, that was two or three years old by this time, she

10

provided a outside third party psychiatrist note attesting to

11

the fitness to practice and also that she was under no

12

medication that would affect motor skills or judgment.

13

As I've tried to make clear and as set forth in our

14

papers, we did not intentionally try to deceive Salt Lake.

15

Regional Medical Center in any way, shape, or form concerning

16

any hospitalization.

17

did not necessarily alert anyone about serious concern.

18

alleged some things in our compliant, yes, but this was way

19

after the fact concerning those peer reviews.

20

The letters -- the letter of January 30
We've

The cerebral fluid leaks, the CFS leaks, it's kind of

21

like being in kindergarten for a neurosurgeon to nick the

22

spinal area once in a while, like kids coloring outside of the

23

lines, I guess.

24

articulated, nothing that was out of the ordinary.

25

was no indication, Your Honor, with respect to "you had too

But there was no serious CFS leaks
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1

many CFS leaks within a one-year period of time, a ten-year

2

period of time,

3

somebody 1 s cervical or back area, will continue for the rest of

4

our lifetime anyway.

11

or whatever.

CFS leaks in neurosurgery with ·

And they're fixed, Your Honor, by a little bit

5

6

of -- I'm not going to say duct tape, I don 1 t want to say

7

that -- but some glue to stop the leak.

8

advised to drink a lot of coffee or otherwise consume caffeine

9

concer~ing getting that thing done or getting that thing closed

And the patient is

10

so it doesn't leak.

11

nothing was articulated as any part of -- any part of·a

12

concern.

13

But, again, reading tpat -- those letters,

Your Honor, they then say that something happened in

14

February after the letter of January 30.

15

this bad faith, part of this malice can be looked at in terms

16

of the fact that the first letter that said anything at all

17

about any concerns was dated November 23rd, that was not

18

received by my client until the 29th of December, 2011.

19

that was when there were only three months left on the

20

conditional six-month offer of privileges that were given.

21

And I think part of

And

So if they were really concerned what happened to the

22

17 days in -- or excuse me, the seven days of November and the

23

30 or so days in December to alert my client, we've got lots of

24

concerns here, let's get these things addressed.

25

Additionally, they sent the letter of January 30 to
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1

my client who didn't get it until the 10th of February.

2

my client has something in her paperwork about the chief of

3

nursing, Bill Southwick asked her if she received a letter.

4

They have objected that that is -- that 1 s the letter that is

5

dated the 30th of January, she received the 10th, and they

6

object on some kind of basis of hearsay that Southwick told her

7

that.

8
9

~

Now,

Whoever told her, Your Honor, whether he did or
however she found out about it, it was clear that the hospital

10

did not give it to her until 10 days after it -- after its

11

authorship, if you will, showing, again, that there was an

12

indifference to any serious concerns.

13

listed were immediately addressed.

14

March 1st to answer the letter and the concerns and she

15

responded and provided answers on the 14th of February in the

16

morning.

17

then -- excuse me, and then suspended.

18

The concerns that were

She -- they gave her until

In the afternoon, she was called in and

Their paperwork -- their affidavits are all

19

lockstepped, like -- and almost verbatim on each of them and

20

they only go to that concerns were stressed in the -- in the

21

February 14th meeting and now -- and now they're arguing

22

without any evidentiary support that patients were discussed in

23

the February 14th meeting.

24

that that did not in fact happen.

4i

~

25

we vehemently take the position

We -- although not in the record, but I will share
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1

with the Court, my client was emotionally devastated, as you

2

can imagine, cried a lot, was asking "Why?

3

getting any response.

4

email from Dr.· Davis about, "Well, why don't you request a fair

5

hearing and we all get together and discuss it."

6

was after the fact.

Why?

Why?" and not

Which, I think, finally led to March 8th

Well, this

As of the 8th of March, she, I think, had finished

7

8

all her proctored cases.

9

March.

She was reinstated on the 16th of

The suspension is still on her ~ecord.

And I think

10

that we have demonstrated that the Healthcare Quality

11

Improvement Act immunity does not apply.

12

Court's concern about bad faith and malice, but I can't imagine

13

anything more in bad faith or more with malice than having a

14

bylaw as a physician at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center that

15

allows for any adverse action for a fair hearing to be

16

requested and as a matter of right granted to that physician,

17

that was not done here.

18

I appreciate the

And I think that overwhelms the entirety of late

19

notice, lack of any articulated-~ clearly articulated concerns

20

in the letters by my client.

21

the classic example of peer review abuse and a classic example

22

of sham peer review for purposes of escaping the immunity for

23

which we're arguing here under the state's statutes, where

24

we're having to show with clear and convincing evidence that

25

there was some malice and bad faith.

And I think it makes this case
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1

volumes.
I think this is a sham peer review case and it's a

2

3

clear example of peer review abuse, and I don't -- shifting

4

positions, if you will, as we've proceeded through this

5

litigation concerning their motion for summary judgment.

6

they were entitled, they say, to an immediate suspension

7

for -- I guess to protect patients, as they say in their

a

affidavit.

9

Now

That wasn't my client's understanding as she ~eft

10

that hearing -- or that meeting on the 14th of February.

11

was not my client's understanding of looking at the

12

February 15th letter.

13

proctoring.

14

strenuously do not agree any which way or form to a proctoring

15

protocol being a substitute for a fair hearing as required by

16

the bylaws and by which she requested and was denied originally

17

with a cursory note by Dr. Davis, and thereafter then, for some

18

reason, entertained and told that we know that you want to know

19

why this happened and the only way we're going to be able to

20

determine that for you -- for your information is for you to

21

get a fair hearing.

22

email.

23

It

My client did not agree to the

And for certain, Your Honor, we vehemently and

That's a fair reading of the March 8th

I think, Your Honor, that the defendants opened the

24

door big time when they attached a priveledged document -- they

25

say is privileged, dated the 8th of March, this email from
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1

Alan Davis.

And have opened the door to all of the so-called

2

quote, privileged and protected activities.

3

prepared to argue that because of concerns about the underlying

4

arguments on the motions that were scheduled, however, I think

5

reading -- a fair reading of this email with Alan Davis's

6

affidavit screams bad faith as my client received it from 14th,

7

at a minimum, of February up to through and including her

8

reinstatement on March 16th.

And I'm not

And, again, without the fair hearing -- and nothing

9

10

is identified in the affidavits as requiring an immediate

11

suspension or what -- nor, any characterization of what

12

happened in February that required this thing on the 14th.

13

will -- for purposes of right now and because of the time, I

14

will entertain questions, or sit down, or do whatever you want

15

me to do.

16

THE COURT:

17

Ms. Maragakis, brief reply.

18

MR. HEDGER:

19

THE COURT:

20

~

I

Thanks .

I'm sorry?
I'm just asking if Ms. Maragakis wanted

to make a reply.

21

MR. HEDGER:

Excuse me, Counsel.

22

MS. MARAGAKIS:

23

I still have not heard anything, nor have I seen

4j

Thank you, Your Honor, very briefly.

24

anything articulated on the papers that approaches showing that

25

the primary purpose of the suspension was something other than
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1

patient care.

2

nothing to contradict the undisputed affidavits of the

3

individuals who made the decision on the summary suspension.

4

will very briefly discuss the various points that Mr. Hedger

5

raised.

6

And second, Your Honor, they've submitted

I

First, this notion that Dr. Levitt didn't know, had

7

no idea, this came out of the blue is, I think, ludicrous,

8

frankly, in light of a number -- the things we've already

9

outlined, but I will tell you, Your Honor, we have not

10

submitted the January 30th letter because we believe it's

11

privileged, but it has been raised by Counsel in other

12

contexts.

13

has raised them.

So I will discuss that to the extent that Counsel

There were three issues outlined in detail in the

14

15

January 30th letter, the first was the hospitalization issue.

16

Now this idea that she didn't intentionally do that --

17

THE COURT:

18

the CEO, it just says,

19

application.

11

The letter acknowledges that she's told
11

I •m familiar with

MS. MARAGAXIS:

20

You need to make it in your

Correct, but I will also note in the

21

complaint, in paragraph 12, she says that she thought it was

22

the functional equivalent of including information while still

23

protecting her privacy.

24

want to disclose it.

25

one issue.

That's why she didn't.

She didn't

But aside from that, Your Honor, that was
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The second issue, which counsel alluded to in the

1

2

last hearing, was a wrong site surgery

3

which counsel raised.

wrong site surgeries,

The third issue, which counsel also noted, was the

4

5

issue of CFS leaks.

And, Your Honor, she actually submitted

6

written protocols to address the CFS leaks.

7

why this suspension occurred, how could she possibly submit

8

written protocols for that?

9

what the basis was is, I think, without merit.

If she had no idea

So the idea that she didn't know

Additionally, there has been nothing cited that she 1 s

10
11

entitled to know those things.

That's not provided in the

12

bylaws and, in fact, it happens all the time that

13

investigations are undertaken without informing the physician.
Your Honor, as to the issue of the fair hearing, it's

14

15

very clear that Dr. Levitt had two choices.

She could go

16

forward with the proctorship or she could go forward with the

17

fair hearing.

18

do both.

19

don't go the way you planned, then you get to engage in the

20

fair hearing process, and that's exactly what she's trying to

21

do now.

What you don't get to do is hedge your bets and

You don't get to start the proctorship and if things

There has been a lot of discussion abo~t the fair

22
23

hearing, so I will -- I do want to delve into that for just a

24

moment.

25

hearing plan to which Mr. Hedger referred provides that the

The fact of the matter is, Your Honor, the fair
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1

practitioner is entitled to notice of a hearing for summary

2

suspension of privileges or staff membership for a period in

3

access of 14 days.

4

It was not clear at the time of the summary

5

suspension that it was going to last longer than 14 days.

6

fact, the letter itself says, "The minimum length of the

7

suspension period, should you meet the following criteria, will

8

remain at least 14 days beginning from February 15th.

9

Your Honor, the requirement of notice isn't even triggered

11

In

So,

10

until we know it's exceeding 14 days.

11

was entitled to notice on February 15th is just wrong under the

12

bylaws.

13

So this idea that she

But in any event, by the time that that period would

14

have even been triggered, she had already sent this May -- or

15

excuse me, February 28th letter.

16

through and discusses at great length the fact that she started

17

this proctorship.

18

have submitted something to Michelle Judy."

19

allegation that she didn't know she was entitled to a fair

20

hearing, she sites the bylaw provision.

And in that letter, she goes

Gj

21

"This is what I'm doing with my cases.

substantial compliance with the bylaws.

23

is she undertook this

25

And there is no

The standard under Don Houston, the Utah case is

22

24

I

THE COURT:

The fact of the matter

this proctoring
Do I even get to substantial compliance

with the bylaws if there is no malice or -Noteworthy Reporting
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1

MS. MARAGAKIS:

I don't think you do, Your Honor, and

2

that's why I point out -- I mean, it's been very difficult to

3

pin down what the malice is, but to the extent that the denial

4

of a fair hearing, the quote, unquote denial, which didn't

5

happen, would be argued as malice, I don't

6

cannot be malice because it was done in

7

compliance -- substantial compliance with the bylaws.

8

9

that simply

The other thing that -- and I heard Mr. Hedger say is
that she got some -- two of the letters late.

I don't know

10

what the explanation is for that.

11

allegation that Mr. Davis or the -- Dr. Davis or Dr. Updike

12

intentionally without that or held it out of malice or

13

something like that. ·

14

But certainly there is no

I mean, the fact that some letters took a long time

15

in the mail, I can't explain that, but that certainly does not

16

rise to the level of rebutting the presumption by clear and

17

convincing evidence.

18

It doesn't come anywhere near that.

So I think, Your Honor, the idea -- and finally, I

19

will just note those affidavits.

20

but the reality is they're also uncontroverted.

21

both subjective and objective evidence of the lack of -- or

22

excuse me, acting in bad faith -- let me rephrase that, that

23

the defendants did not act in bad faith or with malice.

24

25

He said they are lockstep,
So we have

I think that addresses the points, Your Honor.

If

you have any questions, I'm glad to answer those.
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THE COURT:

2

MS. MARAGAKI s:

3

THE COURT:

No, thanks.
Thank you.

Well, first of all, I mean, I think I

4

should acknowledge the record in this case is little atypical

5

it's -- I think "shrouded in secrecy" is not a bad

6

characterization of that, but that is really by necessity

7

because the legislature has already made the policy

8

determination that we don't litigate healthcare quality

9

questions in court and we permit healthcare entities to collect

10

data about healthcare quality and take actions about healthcare

11

quality without subjecting that documentation to even discovery

12

in court.

13

when we start talking about suspension of privileges, but

14

that's by design, that's what the legislature intends.

And that makes these cases peculiarly challenging

15

I understand that plaintiff takes issue with some of

16

the substantive decisions and some of the procedures that were

17

undertaken in her case with the hospital.

18

there is a dispute about whether the hospital substantively

19

complied about the bylaws, whether the plaintiff

20

was -- requested a hearing and was provided an opportunity for

21

that hearing or whether that was denied.

22

that.

23

process, I understand the parties have very different version

24

of.

25

those- faults that the plaintiff takes with the internal

I understand that

I understand all of

The whole issue of proctoring versus the hearing

But it really is problematic for the court to infere from
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1

process, all of which no one has disputed really to healthcare

2

quality improvement and to infere from those missteps the

3

failure, for example, to provide a hearing, malice or lack of

4

good faith.

5

Ordinarily, we look for some sort of extrinsic

6

evidence of good faith, and we look for cases where we sort out

7

an ulterior purpose from healthcare improvement and the

8

challenges that decide whether the primary.purpose was

9

something impermissible like competitive exclusion, no evidence

10

of that in this case.

11

at all in this case.

12

suggests any retaliatory motive.

13

improper purpose, nothing discussed in the testimony about

14

this.

15

Personal enmity, no testimony about that
Retaliation, nothing in this case
Discrimination on some

Instead, I'm asked to infere just from the sum total

16

of what plaintiffs contends are missteps in the care review

17

process to infere from that malice.

18

or lack of good faith by clear and convincing evidence it would

19

overcome a presumption, a statutory presumption of good faith

20

and lack of malice.

21

And not only that malice

I can't do that.

When I -- when I look at this record and I've looked

22

thoroughly at all of plaintiff's theories, the secrecy

23

surrounding the collection of ten cases for peer review, there

24

is a simple explanation for that secrecy, is to preserve the

25

peer review privilege.

The conditional reappointment doesn't
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1

strike me as malice, it's.reappointment.

2

notifying of reappointment -- of the conditional reappointment,

3

perhaps it's sloppy, but it doesn't lead to an inference of

4

malice.

5

The delays in

The refusal discussed, again, I have talked about the

6

necessity for preserving the privilege around protecting

7

healthcare processes within the entity.

a

suspension, I am -- you know, the parties have danced around

9

the reason for that, I understand the reasons that, but I can't

The summary

10

from just the fact of the summary suspension infer from that

11

that there is some lack of good faith or malice.

12

The proctoring requirements seems more like an

13

opportunity to seek reinstatement than ft is some sort of

14

malicious act or some act taken in bad faith ·and that's borne

15

out by the fact that Dr. Levitt's privileges were ultimately

16

reinstated.

17

So based on all of that, I have conclude that

18

plaintiff has failed to meet her burden in rebutting the

19

presumption of good faith and lack of malice and therefore all

20

of the actions complained of within the complaint are subject

21

to the immunity under the state law.

22

subjects them to the immunity granted in the bylaw, but I don't

23

reach that.

24

law immunity appl.ies and summary judgment should be granted.

25

I think it probably also

I think it is sufficient simply to say that state

Ask Ms. Maragakis to prepare an order.
Noteworthy Reporting

801.634.5549

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

MS. MARAGAKIS:

1

2

your time.

We appreciate

we will prepare an order.

3

THE COURT:

4

MR. HEDGER:

5

Thank you, Your Honor.

Okay.

Thanks everybody.

Thank you, Your Honor.

(End of hearing.)

6

7
8

9

10
1·1

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20

21

22
23
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25

Noteworthy Reporting

801.634.5549

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

012sd 1

CERTIFICATE

1
2
3

4

STATE OF UI'AH

5

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

) ss
)

6
7
8
9

I, KATIE HARMON, a Certified Shorthand Reporter in

10

and for the State of Utah, do hereby certify that I received

11

the audio recording in this matter, and that I transcribed it

12

into typewriting and that a full, true and correct

13

transcription of said audio recording so recorded and

14

transcribed is set forth in the foregoing pages, inclusive

15

except where it is indicated that the recording was inaudible.

(iij

16
17
18
19

DATED this 13th day of April, 2018.

20

21
22

KATIE HARMON, RPR, CSR

23
24

25

0125f 8
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

although [4] 5/24 8/24 13/22
able [3] 3/25 19/13 28/19
26/25
about [31]
MR. DIBBLE: [2] 3/8 3/14
am [5] 9/2 10/19 12/13 15/2
absence [2] 6/24 14/12
MR. HEDGER: [13]
36/8
absent [1] 5/4
MS. MARAGAKIS: [19]
ambiguity [1] 23/13 .
absolutely [1] 9/17
THE COURT: [28]
ANDREW [1] 1/12
abundance [1] 11/6
animosity [1] 10/11
abundant [2] 10/3 10/3
1
annotated [1] 5/1
abundantly [1] 14/14
10 [2] 7/1 26/10
annoy [1] 10/8
abuse (2] 27/21 28/3
1052 [1] 2/4
another [2] 10/9 17/15
accept[2] 11 /20 11 /21
10th [1] 26/5
answer [2] 26/14 33/25
accepted [2] 11/18 11/24
10th of [1] 26/1
answers [1] 26/15
access [2] 22/25 32/3
12 [1] 30/21
anyone [1] 24/17
acknowledge [1] 34/4
13th [1] 38/19
anything [5] 22/19 25/16
acknowledges [1] 30/17
14 [4] 32/3 32/5 32/8 32/10
27/13 29/23 29/24
act (11]
1400 [1] 2/8
anyway [1] 25/4
acted [1] 5/3
14th [7] 15/13 20/4 26/21
anywhere [2] 20/9 33/17
acting [1] 33/22
26/23 28/10 29/6 29/12
apologize [4] 3/22 9/3 15/12
action [10]
14th of [4] 18/20 20/8 20/12
15/14
actions [4] 6/15 6/17 34/10
26/15
apparently [1] 7/12
36/20
15th [3] 28/12 32/8 32/11
appear [1] 20/9
activities [2] 4/21 29/2
16 [1] 9/15
appearances [1] 3/6
acts [1] 14/5
160900952 [2] 1/6 3/5
appeared [1] 21/10
actually [2] 12/6 31/5
16th [2] 12/11 29/8
application [4] 8/23 23/17
adamant [1] 22/4
16th of [1] 27/8
23/20 30/19
Adams [1] 3/10
17 [1] 25/22
applied [2] 5/10 5/11
addition [1] 6/22
1st [1] 26/14
additional [3J 8/17 8/20 11/1 O applies [1] 36/24
Additionally [2) 25/25 31/10 apply [2) 14/19 27/11
2
appointment [1) 14/2
address [4] 14/2114/22
20 [2] 9/1 19/25
appreciate [5] 4/1 4/14 15/15
14/23 31/6
2009 [2] 23/16 24/4
27/11 37/1
addressed [4] 14/12 22/22
2011 [3] 7/11 23/18 25/18
approach [2] 17/2 21/18
25/24 26/13
2012 [2] 8/9 9/15
approaches [1] 29/24
addresses [1) 33/24
2018 [3] 1/18 3/1 38/19
appropriate [1] 14/14
adequate [3] 11/12 13/10
23 [1] 7/10
approxin:,ately [1] 19/8
23/1
23rd [1] 25/17
April [1] 38/19
administrator [1] 22/21
24th [3] 9/5 9/19 15/14
are [19)
admissibility [1] 22/15
24th of [1) 19/24
area [2] 24/22 25/3
28 [4] 17/917/17 18/3 20/16 admitted [1] 8/22
argue [2] 23/9 29/3
adverse [3] 21 /21 21 /22
28th [2] 22/8 32/15
argued [1] 33/5
27/15
29th of [1] 25/18
arguing [3] 23/6 26/21 27/23
advised [4] 18/21 21/21
argument
[7] 11 /25 15/21
21/22
25/8
3
affect [4] 7/19 8/7 8/11 24/12 17/6 18/25 20/10 21f7 23/24
30 [7] 8/9 9/22 12/12 24/16
·
affidavit [7] 17/22 18/6 19/19 arguments [1] 29/4
25/14 25/23 25/25
around [2] 36/6 36/8
30th [5] 8/13 8/17 24/7 30/1 O 22/1 23/20 28/8 29/6
articulate [1] 15/21
affidavits [5] 20/1 O 26/18
30/15
articulated [8] 7/10 8/918/19
29/10 30/2 33/19
30th of [1] 26/5
24/24 25/11 27/19 27/19
afforded
[2]
11/12
23/2
36 [1] 2/8
29/24
after [13]
afternoon [3] 3/4 3/20 26/16 aside [1] 30/24
4
ask [3] 16/12 16/23 36/25
afterwards [1] 15/1
450 [1] 1/15
asked [6] 17/19 18/18 19/4
again [14)
4th [1] 17/12
20/18 26/3 35/15
ago [1] 4/3
asking [2] 27/2 29/19
agree [3] 19/5 28/12 28/14
5
assertions [1] 18/7
agreed [1] 14/1
58-13-4 [1] 5/1
asserts
[1] 22/1
Alan
[4]
3/11
6/3
29/1
29/5
5th [1] 17/12
attached [6] 12/6 12/8 15/7
alert [2] 24/17 25/23
16/8 21/15 28/24
6
all [30]
attention [11 16/1
allegation [3] 12/5 32/19
6th [1] 17/12
attesting [1] 24/1 O
33/11
8
alleged [3] 10/14 14/11 24/18 Attorney [1] 2/3
atypical [1] 34/4
·
allow [1] 17/5
84047 [1] 2/4
audio [2] 38/11 38/13
allowed [1] 9/10
84111 [21 1/15 2/8
authorized [1] 14/4
allows [1] 27/15
8th [7] 12/14 13/1 19/21
authorship [1] 26/11
alluded [1] 31/1
20/24 22/5 27/3 28/21
Ave [1] 2/4
almost [1] 26/19
8th of [2] 27/7 28/25
aware [4] 4/4 24/2 24/2 24/3
already [51 21/5 24/9 30/8
A
32/14 34/7
B
also [23]
ability [2] 16/1117/16
back [3] 19/16 24/4 25/3

bad [13)
based [1] 36/17
basis [5] 4/1 O 13/24 14/20
26/6 31/9
battling [1] 10/19
because (14]
been [13)
before [4] 1/12 5/9 12/25
18/25
beg (1] 15/25
beginning [1] 32/8
behalf [1] 22/12
being [6] 6/20 8/8 21/22
21/23 24/21 28/15
belabor [1] 4/3
belled [1] 9/18
belief [1] 11/1
belies [11 21f7
believe [4] 7/1 14/17 24/1
30/10
below [11 4/24
bets [1] 31/17
betwe~n [2] 9/6 15/1 O
bevy [1] 6/22
big [1] 28/24
Bill [1] 26/3
bit (2] 11/15 25/5
blue [1] 30/7
board [2] 7/3 18/2
board-certified [1] 7/3
booked [1] 3/24
borne [2] 10/14 36/14
both [8] 4/10 5/19 14/18
15/21 17/6 24/3 31/18 33/21
bothered [1] 18/8
breached [2] 18/1418/15
brief (2) 20/7 29/17
briefing [2] 4/2 5/18
briefly [2] 29/22 30/4
briefs [1] 4/6
bright [1] 21/25
broad [11 4/18
bump [1} 3/23
burden [3] 5/12 5/13 36/18
bylaw [4] 18/22 27/14 32/20
36/22
bylaws [14]

~
!

ii

~

(i)

i>

(11)

Ci\

C
caffeine [1] 25/8
call [1] 4/16
called [3] 9/13 26/16 29/1
came [1] 30/7
can [10]
can't [4] 27/12 33/15 35/20
36/9
cannot [1] 33/6
capacities [2] 4/20 4/24
care [6] 7/10 8/8 13/15 18/14
30/1 35/16
career [11 8/20
case [19]
cases [20}
cause [1] 17/25
caused [1] 17/12
causes [1] 14/20
Cecil [2] 2/3 3ll
Center (3] 3/11 24/15 27/14
CEO [6] 6/4 7/21 9/915/13
24/2 30/18

~

@·

@

01252
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

(if>

<ii

@

~

<,

~

@

~

<ii

~)

(ii)

C
complied [1] 34/19
Davis's [2] 21/25 29/5
DISTRICT [1] 1/1
cerebral [1] 24/20
comprehensive [1] 10/18
day [3] 9/25 21/25 38/19
do [24]
certain (1] 28/13
concern [5] 7/9 8/8 24/17
days [15]
doctor [4] 11/11 12/1412/14
deadline [1] 17/9
24/4
certainly (5] 5/24 8/20 10/13 25/12 27/12
33/10 33/15
concern~d [2] 23/15 25/21
deadlines [1] ?,213
doctors [11 24/2
concerning [7] 15/23 17/6
deal [1] 5/25
document [2] 7/9 28/24
certified [2] 7/3 38/9
22/19 24/15 24/19 25/9 28/5 dealing [1) 17n
documentation [1] 34/11
certify [1] 38/10
cervical [1] 25/3
concerns [14]
deceive [1] 24/14
documented [1] 7/9
cetera [2] 18/15 23/21
conclude [1] 36/17
December [2] 25/18 25/23
documents [1] 22/11
CFS [6] 24/20 24/23 25/1
concomitant [1] 18/21
decide [1] 35/8
does [4] 10ll 20/9 27/11
25/2 31/5 31/6
concussion [1] 17/13
decision [1] 30/3
33/15
chain [1] 12/13
cond!t!on [1] 8/10
decisions [2] 4/22 34/16
doesn't [4] 25/10 33/17 35/25
chairs [1] 9/8
cond1t1onal (3] 25/20 35/25
declaration [1] 6/3
36/3
challenges [1] 35/8
36/2
declarations [2] 6/2 6/17
doing [3] 18/10 19/6 32/17
challenging [1] 34/12
consider [1] 16/19
defeated [1] 13/19
Don [1] 32/21
chance I1] 9/3
considered [1] 16/8
DEFENDANT {2] 1/9 2/5
don't [18]
change [1] 7/24
consi~tent [1] 7/25
defendants [10]
done [4] 21/125/927/17 33/6
changes [1] 7/23
constitute [1] 10/3
defendants' [1] 3/12
door [3] 16/11 28/24 29/1
characterization [2] 29/11
construed [1] 13/8
defined [1] 10/10
double [1] 3/24
34/6
consume [1] 25/8
defining [1] 5/25
double-booked [1] 3/24
contemplated [1] 19/18
definition [1] 10/8
down [2] 29/14 33/3
characterized [1] 9/11
chief [2] 23/22 26/2
contend [2] 9/15 20/11
delays [1] 36/1
Dr [36]
choices [1] 31/15
conten~s [2] 8/24 35/16
deliberations [1] 4/22
drink [1] 25/8
circumstances [2] 11/14 23/4 contention [1] 11/15
delve [1] 31/23
duct [1] 25/6
cited [5] 5/1210/613/414/8 contents (1) 9/18
demonstrate [2] 6/23 19/12 1-E_..;;...;;.._______ •
31/1 o
contexts (1] 30/12
demonstrated (1] 27/1 o
CITY [2] 1/15 2/8
continue [1] 25/3
denial [3] 21/25 33/3 33/4
each [1] 26/19
claim [1] 23/15
continued [1] 20/2
denied [5] 12/5 21/24 23/9
early [1] 21/12
claiming [1] 23/25
continues [2] 9/25 10/1
28/16 34/21
earth [1] 20/23
claims [2] 4ll 7/20
contractional [1] 4/11
denies [1] 17/24
East [1] 2/4
clarification [1] 7/17
contradict [1] 30/2
depositions [1] 6/9
easy [1] 4/18
classic (2] 27/21 27/21
contrary (1] 5/5
derail [1] 8/19
educational [1] 19/5
clear (13]
controvert [1] 20/21
described [1] 5/2
effect [1] 24/6
clearly [41 7/10 18/19 21/20 convenience [2] 15ll 21/16 design [1] 34/14
effected [1] 6/6
27/19
Conversation [1] 15/10
detail [1] 30/14
efficient [1] 14/24
convincing [7] 5/4 5/8 5/10
determination [2] 17/1 34/8 effort [2] 8/19 11/9
client [22]
determ!natlons [1] 4/22
efforts [1] 20/2
client1s [7] 17/11 18/6 19/19 101? 27/24 33/17 35/18
22ll 23/19 28/9 28/11
copied [1] 22/6
determine [4] 17/1719/21
Elaina [2] 2/6 3/10
clinical [5] 7/19 8ll 8/1113/9 copy [3] 12/6 21/15 22/6
20/16 28/20
elevated [1] 11/5
14/2
correct (8] 3/14 3/15 3/18
determining [2] 16/19 22/15 email [18]
closed [1] 25/9
12/13 13/2 16/17 30/20 38/12 devastated (1] 27/1
emotionally [1] 27/1
Code [1] 5/1
correction [1] 15/15
Dibble [2] 2/7 3/9
employed [1] 10/1
coffee (11 25/8
correspondence [2] 7/8 19/1 did [15]
encompass [1] 4/9
1
cold [1] 10/19
could (11]
didn t[9] 11/20 26/1 30/6
end [2] 6/2 37/5
collect [1] 34/9
counsel [14]
30/16 30/23 30/23 31/8 32/19 engage (1] 31/19
collection [1] 35/23
count [2] 17/9 18/3
33/4
enmity (1] 35/10
counts [1] 17/18
Diego [1] 23/11
enough [1] 10/12
coloring [1] 24/22
come [1] 33/17
COUNTY [2] 1/2 38/5
different [3] 13/22 14/10
entertain [2] 21/17 29/14
comment [1] 22/1
couple [3] 8/315/20 15/25
34/23
entertained [1] 28/18
comments [1] 19/22
court [24]
difficult [1] 33/2
entire [1] 23/12
committee [3] 7/24 8/14 9/8 Court's [6] 14/25 15/6 15/19 disallowed [1] 19/9
entirety [7] 16/12 17/5 21/10
committees.[1] 5/2
16/1 21/16 27/12
discharged [1) 7/21
21/14 21/14 23/12 27/18
common [1] 13/13
COURTHOUSE [1] 1/14
disclose [1] 30/24
entities [2] 4/20 34/9
communicate [2] 22/19 23/13 covers [1] 4/10
disclosed [11 8/25
entitled [9] 12/1 13/18 20/13
credentialing [2] 7/24 8/13
disclosures [1] 14/5
23/8 28/6 31 /11 32/1 32/11
communications [1] 14/5
competitive [1] 35/9
c~ed [1] 27/2
discovery [4] 3/14 6/9 21/11 32/19
compiled [1] 5/18
criteria [1] 32ll
34/11
entity [1] 36ll
complained [1] 36/20
CSR [2] 1/22 38/22
Discrimination [1] 35/12
equally [1] 19/22
current [3] 8/4 9/8 24/8
discuss [3] 27/5 30/4 30/12 equivalent [1] 30/22
complains [1] 8/3
complaint [3) 7/14 30/21
cursory [3) 9/1119/24 28/17 discussed [10]
Erin [1] 3/10
36/20
D
discusses [2] 5/16 32/16
error [1] 15/14
complete [3] 19/319/15
1---------1discussing [1] 5/12
escaping [1] 27/22
19/16
.
danced (1] 36/8
discussion (3] 18/12 20n
establish [2] 5/19 6/17
danger l21 13111 13/ 16
. 31/22
et[2] 18/15 23/21
completed [6] 11/19 11/22
19/6 19/8 21 /5 23/17
data [21 1811 34110
dispose (11 3/17
even [5] 7/13 32/9 32/14
completion [1] 9/24
.
Databank [1] 9/22
dispute [2] 11/23 34/18
32/24 34/11
compliance [4] 32/22 32/24 date [3] 12/24 13/3 15/12
disputed [4] 6/8 14/1515/4 event [2] 9/16 32/13
33n 3
dated [5] 22/7 25/17 26/5
35/1
ever [1] 19/17
317
281~5 38/19
compliant [1] 24/18
disruption [1] 19/15
everybody [1] 37/3
Davis [17]
everyone [1] 3/23

01253
~

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

E
evidence [19]
evidences [1]
evidentiary [1] 26/22
exact [1] 13/3
exactly [1] 31/20
example [4] 27/21 27/21 28/3
35/3
exceeding [1] 32/10
except [1] 38/15
exception [4] 13/513/713/19
16/3
exchange [1] 23/7
exclusion [1] 35/9
excuse [8] 10/19 15/1319/1
25/22 26/17 29/21 32/15
33/22
excused [1] 8/24
executive [2] 9/8 23/22
Exhibit [4] 17/2319/18 21/11
23/19
Exhibit-1 [1] 17/23
Exhibit-3 [2] 19/18 23/19
Exhibit-C [1] 21/11
existence [1] 6/23
explain [1] 33/1 5
explanation [3] 19/10 33/10
35/24
extend [6] 14/2 17/1717/25
20/1821/1122/2
extending [2] 17/9 17/14
extension [3] 3/1417/1218/2
extent [4] 6/18 7/4 30/12 33/3
external [1] 7/2
extreme [1] 24/1
extrinsic [1] 35/5

an

1

F
facilities [1] 19/14
fact t
261
factors [1] 10/2
facts [4] 5/19 11/3 11 /1 o
14/15
failed [1] 36/18
failure [3] 13/1 o 23/1 3 36/3
fair (39]
fairing [1] 12/17
faith [27]
fall [2] 17/11 17/20
familiar [1] 30/19
faults [1] 34/25
February (26]
February 14th [4] 15/13 20/4
26/21 26/23
February 15th [11 28/12
February 20 [1] 9/1
February 24th (2) 9/5 9/19
February 28th (2) 22/8 32/15
federal [4] 4/11 14/18 15/22
17/6
feels [1] 14/23
fell [1] 17/13
fellowships [1] 7/3
filed [3] 16/2 16/6 21/11
finally [4] 9/14 13/24 27/3
33/18
financially [1] 6/13
find [1] 20/2
fine [1] 16/25

fingers [1] 23/12
fin!sh [1] 23n
finished [1] 27/7
first [9] 3/17 5/6 5/22
6/24
25/16 30/6 30/15 34/3
fit (11 24/4
fitness [1] 24/11
five [1] 7/18
fixed [1] 25/5
flu_[1J 10/20
fluid [1] 24/20
focus [3] 4/8 5/15 14/24
focused [2] 10/16 15/2
fog [11 23/10
folder_[1] 4/13
following [3] 4/1914/7 32/7
foregoing [2] 13/21 38/14
form (3] 12/8 24/15 28/14
former [1] 9/8
forth [3] 15/8 24/13 38/14
forward [2] 31/16 31/16
found [1] 26/9
four [1] 10/25
frankly [1] 30/8
Franzen [3] 6/4 9/9 19/24
fraud [2] 14/6 14/10
full [1_1 38/12
fun~tlonal [1] 30/22
furnished [1] 4/23
further[6] 7/178/28/88/21
12122 19/5
furtherance [1] 11/2
future [21 7125 21/5

7/11 8/912/23 38/15
indicates [1] 17/8
indicating [1] 19/2
indication [1] 24/25
indifference [1] 26/12
individual [1] 13/12
individuals [1] 30/3
inexplicable [1] 16/7
infer [1] 36/10
infere [4] 34/24 35/2 35/15
35/17
inference [1] 36/3
information [12]
informing [11 31/13
injure [3] 6/12 6/13 10/9
inquiry [1] 8/21
instances [1] 7/9
Instead [1] 35/15
instructive [1] 19/22
intends [1] 34/14
intent [2] 6/20 10/9
intentional [3] 8/15 14/6
14/10
intentionally [4] 23/25 24/14
30/16 33/12
internal [1) 34/25
Internally (1) 7/1
interpreted [2] 6/1 6/19
investigations [1] 31/13
invite[1] 11/10
invited [1] 8/20
I
involved [4] 11/1318/12 21/2
23/2
G
I'll [1] 14/24
involving [2] 14/618/12
I'm [14]
Isn't [1] 32/9
gave [1] 26/13
I've [4] 4/13 21/15 24/13
issue [20]
general [1] 19/2
35/21
issues [5] 8/15 8/16 11n 15/8
get [10]
IASIS [5] 1/7 3/5 3/10 19/2
30/14
getting [3] 2519 25/9 27/3
19/14
issuing [1] 6/5
give [4] 1
15/1 23/22
idea [9] 9/17 13/17 23/6 30/7 it [75]
~6/10
30/16 31/6 31/8 32/10 33/18 it's (27]
9!ven [2] 10/4 25/20
identified [1] 29/1 O
items [2] 6/23 10/15
g!v~s [1] 14/8
Imagine [2] 27/2 27/12
its [3] 14/4 22/15 26/10
giving [11 9/11
immanent [1] 13/11
itself [2] 23/20 32/6
glad [2] 14/22 33/25
immediate [7] 13/8 13/16
glue [1] 25/7
16/3 16/5 20/8 28/6 29/10
_J_ _ _ _ _ _ __
go [7] 12/21 19/16 24/4 26/20 Immediately [2] 13/15 26/13 January (1 O]
31/15 31/16 31/19
immune [2] 4/21 4/25
January 30 [3] 8/9 24/16
God's [1] 20/23
immunity [20]
25/25
goes [1] 32/15
impact[1] 11/8
January 30th [5] 8/13 8/17
going [7] 12/10 17/25 18/10 impermissible [1] 35/9
24/7 30/10 30/15
20/3 25/6 28/19 32/5
implemented [1] 20/6
Jeff [3] 6/4 9/9 19/24
good [171
importance [1] 7/20
JODIE [1] 1/4
got [3] 21/15 25/23 33/9
important [9] 4/8 4/25 5/6
Jonathan [2] 2/7 3/9
granted [5] 13/2514/1 27/16 7/24 9/1212/217/417/18
judgment [18]
36122 36/24
18/5
JUDICIAL [1] 1/1
great [2] 5/25 32/16
improper [1] 35/13
Judy [2] 22/20 32/18
green [1 l 20/23
improvement [7] 10/24 15/22 just [20)
gu~ss [3] 23/7 24/23 28/7
_16/4 22/23 27/11 35/2 35n - - ~ - - - - - guidance [1] 14/25
inappropriate [1] 24/1
_K_ _ _ _ _ _ __
H
inaudible [3] 12/1515/4
Katie [3] 1/22 38/9 38/22
38/15
kids [1] 24/22
had [21)
INC [2] 1n 3/5
kind [5] 15/2 23/10 23/13
hand [11 4113
inclined (11 21/17
24/20 26/6
happen [21 26/24 33/5
include [1] 8/22
kindergarten [1] 24/21
happened [5] 13/6 25/13
Including [3] 8/15 29/7 30/22 know [20]
25/21 28/19 29/12
inclusive [1] 38/14
knows [1] 4/5
1
happens [1] 31/12
Independent [1] 14/20
_ _......;...._ _ _ _ _ _
Harmon [3] 1/22 38/9 38/22 indicate [1] 14/15
.'=
has [20]
indicated [7] 5/23 6/4 6/25
lack [91 10/3 14/16 27/19

an

have [40)
having [5] 3/23 7/4 22/19
27/13 27/24
health [1] 13/11
healthcare [18]
·
hear [2] 3/16 3/18
heard [2] 29/23 33/8
hearing [51)
hearsay [1] 26/6·
hedge [1] 31/17
Hedger [8] 2/3 3n 15/11
15/15 15/17 30/4 31/25 33/8
held [1] 33/12
here [15]
h~reby [1] 38/10
hide [1] 24/1
HIPAA [2] 10/18 13/7
his [3] 17/22 20/17 22/1
hold [1] 17/17
HOLDINGS [2] 1n 3/5
Honor [76]
Honor's [1] 4/12
HONORABLE [1] 1/12
hospital [9] 13/1414/418/10
18/16 19/2 22/21 26/9 34/17
34/18
hospitalization [6] 7/18 8/16
8/23 23/16 24/16 30/15
Houston [1] 32/21
how[1] 31n
however [3] 15/25 26/9 29/4

~
i
I
I

ii

®)

•
~

on

@

1

01254
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

•
•
•

~
many [5] 4/9 10/19 11/17
11/17 25/1
lack ... [6] 33/21 35/3 35/18
Maragakls [5] 2/6 3/1 29/17
35/20 36/11 36/19
29/19 36/25
LAKE [8] 1/2 1/15 2/8 3/10
March [18]
8/10 24/14 27/14 38/5
18 March 16 (1] 9/15
language [3] 5/15 7/14 23/
March 16th [2] 12/11 29/8
last [7] 5/9 5/23 7/18 9/22
March 1st [1] 26/14
21/12 31/2 32/5
March 8th [7] 12/14 13/1
late [2] 27/18 33/9
19/21 20/24 22/5 27/3 28/21
law [6] 2/3 5/25 10/4 14/18
material [11 23/18
36/21 36/24
materials [1] 14/15
lawyer (2] 21/2 21/3
MATHESON [1] 1/14
lead [1] 36/3
matter [7] 10/411/10 11/21
leadership [1] 7/23
27/16 31/24 32/22 38/11
leak [2] 25/7 25/1 o
may [9] 3/16 3/17 7/19 13/11
leaks [7] 24/20 24/20 24/23
17/2 21/18 22/3 22/8 32/14
25/1 25/2 31/5 31/6
MD [1] 1/4
least [3] 6/9 12/22 32/8
me [16)
led [3] 7/12 21/1 27/3
mean [3] 33/2 33/14 34/3
left [2] 25/19 28/9
meaning [1] 17/10
legislature [2] 34/7 34/14
means [1] 13/14
length [2] 32/6 32/16
MEC [2] 9/9 21/3
let [1] 33/22
medical [5] 3/11 9/8 22/20
let's [2] 3/18 25/24
24/15 27/14
letter [19]
medication [2] 24/5 24/12
letters [6] 9/19 24/16 25/1 o
medications [3] 7/18 8/6 8/11
27/20 33/9 33/14
meet [3] 9/13 32ll 36/18
level [1] 33/16
meeting [9] 9/5 9/6 9/19
LEVITT [15]
15/12 18/20 20/4 26/21 26/23
Levitt's [2] 14/1 36/15
28/10
liability [2] 4/21 14/3
members [1] 7/23
lifetime [1] 25/4
membership [11 32/2
lifted [2] 9/24 11 /22
memorandum [2] 16/2 21 /13
light [1] 30/8
mental [1] 8/10
lights [1] 21/25
merit [1] 31/9
like [11]
met [21 10/25 13/22
limited [1] 14/7
Michelle [2] 22/20 32/18
line [1] 15/7
Midvale [1] 2/4
lines [1] 24/23
might [2] 8/6 8/11
list [6] 7/12 8/15 9/11 9/14
m!n~ [4] 5/23 5/24 6/1 6/19
14/8 19/24
minimum [2] 29/7 32/6
listed (1] 26/13
minute [1] 18/20
litigate [1] 34/8
missteps [2] 35/2 35/16
litigation [1] 28/5
moment [1] 31/24
little [3] 14/1 o 25/5 34/4
month [1] 25/20
lockstep [1] 33/19
months [1] 25/19
lockstepped [1] 26/19
more [6] 7/13 12/18 14/24
lodge [1] 22/1 o
27/13 27/13 36/12
long [21 4/3 33/14
morning [2] 23/11 26/16
longer [21 9/22 32/5
most [11 10/17
look [4] 5/16 35/5 35/6 35/21
motion [11]
looked [2] 25/15 35/21
motions [1] 29/4
looking [1] 28/11
motivation [1] 6/5
lot [3] 25/8 27/2 31 /22
motive (4) 6/12 6/13 7/5
lots [1] 25/23
35/12
ludicrous (1] 30/7
motor [5] 7/19 8/7 8/12 24/6
24/12
M
m oved [2] 4/6 14/19
made [6] 4/22 8/21 12/25
M r [2] 15/11 15/1 7
12/25 30/3 34/7
Mr. [5] 15/15 30/4 31 /25 33/8
mail [11 33/15
33/11
m aintain [2] 14/13 22110
M r. Davis [1] 33/11
m ajar [11 19/15
Mr• Hedger [4] 15/15 30/4
m ake (5] 4/18 8/2 24/13
31 /25 33/8
29/20 30/18
[2] 29/19 36/25
Ms
makes [2] 27/20 34/12
Ms . [11 29/17
making [1] 17/1
Ms • Maragakis [1] 29/17
ma lice [40]
my [32]
malicious [1] 36/14

L

o

<iw

N
name [1] 12/22
namely [1] 11/4
National [2] 9/21 18/1
near [1] 33/17
NEBEKER [1] 2/7
necessarily [1] 24/17
necessity [2] 34/6 36/6
need [2] 15/20 30/18
needed [2] 8/4 24/8
neon [1] 21/25
neurologists [1] 7/3
neurosurgeon [11 24/21
neurosurgeons (2) 7/2 7/6
neurosurgery [1] 25/2
never [3] 9/21 12/20 19/17
nick [1] 24/21
nine [2] 19/8 19/16
no [30]
No. [1] 16/11
No. 1 [1] 16/11
not [47]
note [17]
noted [11 31/4
nothing [11]
notice (11]
notify [1] 18/23
notifying [11 36/2
Noting. [1] 22/14
notion [1] 30/6
November [3] 7/1 25/17
25/22
November 23 [1] 7110
November 23rd [1] 25/17
now [11]
NPDB [1] 9/23
number [5] 4/7 5/12 5/18 118
30/8
nursing [1] 26/3

operation (1] 17/20
opportunity [6] 12/5 15/1
16/13 20/17 34/20 36/13
opposition [3] 16/6 18/6
19/19
option [1] 12/2
order [2] 36/25 37/2
Ordinarily [1] 35/5
ordinary [1] 24/24
or~~nizations [1] 4/20
ongmally [3] 19/9 19/17 28/16
other [13]
others [1] 10/19
otherwise [2] 6/14 25/8
our [13]
out [14]
outlined [3] 8/16 30/9 3011 4
outside [3] 11/5 24/10 24/22
overcome [2] 5/8 35/19
overreaching [1] 10/11
overwhelms [11 27/18

p

page [2] 5/17 18/22
pages [11 38/14
papers [5] 5/11 13/5 14/8
24/14 29/24
paperwork [2] 26/2 26/18
paragraph [3] 20/24 22/25
30/21
part [7) 20/10 20/10 22/10
25/11 25/11 25/14 25/15
particular [1] 4/8
particularly [2] 10/4 18/5
parties [3] 14/4 34/23 36/8
party [1] 24/1 o
passing [1] 21/13
past[1] 6/25
patient [6] 7/1 O 8/8 13/15
20/8 25/7 30/1
patients
[8] 6/7 10/11 10/13
0
20n 20120 20122 2a122 2817
object [1] 26/6
peculiarly [1] 34/12
objected [1] 26/4
peer [20]
objection [3] 22/1 22/12
pending [4] 7/13 7/1611/4
,22/14
21/21
objective [4] 5/19 6/20 8/8
performed [1) 14/6
33/21
perhaps [ 1) 36/3
obligation [2] 7/21 18/22
period [5] 25/1 25/2 32/2 32/7
obtain [11 11/1 o
32/13
obviously [2] 6/8 11/6
permission [1] 4/12
occur [1] 12/11
permit [1] 34/9
occurred [1] 31/7
erson [1] 10/9
of within [1] 36/20
Personal [2] 10/11 35/1 o
Perusal [1] 21/16
offer [2] 12/24 25/20
officer [1] 23/23
p
hysician [9] 11/1413/15
okay [6] 3/12 15/3 16/1817/8 P
8/12 21/21 23/2 23/3 27/14
23/22 37/3
1
27/16 31/13
d [2] 8/4 24/9
pin [1] 33/3
ol
mitted [1] 23/16
pi npoint [1) 23/11
ce [3] 4/1 21 /20 24/22
pl ace [2] 9/6 11 /24
on e 171 3/24 4/8 1
22111
on
pl aintiff [12]
5/1 30/25 35/1
pl aintiffs [1] 35/22
2 e-year [11 25/1
plaintiffs [1] 35/16
on going [1] 19/11
pla n [5] 21/10 21/10 21/14
on
ly [11]
21 /16 31/25
on ened [2] 28/23 29/1
op
pla nned [1] 31/19
op ens [1] 16/10
pie ase [1] 3/6
op erating [3] 17/11 17/14
poi nt [21]
19/13
poi nted [1] 15/11

o

o

°

sn

'

01255
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

p

reply [5] 16/2 20/7 21 /13
29/17 29/20
pointing [1] 15/15
reported [2] 9/21 22/3
points [3] 4/7 30/4 33/24
Reporter [1] 38/9
policy [1] 34/7
represent [1] 22/18
portion [1] 21 /6
representatives [1] 14/4
position [2] 11 /13 26/23
representing [1] 3/10
positions [1] 28/4
reproduced [1] 4/17
possibly [2] 3/17 31 /7
request [8] 8/2 12/10 12/17
potential [2] 11/7 11/7
Q
20/13 21/2 21/24 2217 27/4
power [1] 20/17
requested [9] 7/17 8/14 8/17
quality"[11]
practice (1] 24/11
22/4 23/8 23/21 27/16 28/16
question [1] 15/9
practitioner [2] 9/21 32/1
questions [4] 20/2 29/14
34/20
Practitione~s (1] 18/1
required [7] 13/18 19/2 19/7
33/25 34/9
precluding [1] 13/8
19/9 23/21 28/15 29/12
quick [1] 15/9
preface [1] 19/22
requirement [2] 21/20 32/9
QUINNl;Y [1] 2/7
prepare [2] 3~/25 37/2
requirements [2] 18/1 36/12
quip [11 21/13
prepared [3] 4/13 14/22 29/3 quote [3] 24/8 29/2 33/4
requires [2] 10/25 15/22
preponderance [2] 13/22
requiring [1] 29/10
quoted [1] 7/15
15/23
resolved [1] 11/18
presented [1] 18/23
R
respect [15]
preserve [11 35/24
raised [4] 30/5 30/11 30/13
respond [1] 9/3
preserving [3] 16/22 22/12
31/3
responded [1] 26/15
36/6
RAY [1] 217
response [6] 12/14 12/16
presumed [1 l 5/3
reach [1] 36/23
12/21 20/2 24/7 27/3
presumption [BJ 517 sn 10/5 read [1] 17/5
responses [31 8/14·8/18
13/21 33/16 35/19 35/19
reading [5] 12/13 25/10 28/21 11/11
36/19
29/5 29/5
rest [3] 17/5 19/21 25/3
previously [1] 14/12
reality [1] 33/20
restriction [1] 13/8
primarily [1] 18/18
really [7] 6/20 11 /20 23/11
result [2] 13/11 20/8
primary [4] 10/10 10/12 29/25 25/21 34/6 34/24 35/1
Retaliation [1] 35/11
35/8
reappointment [5] 14/2 35/25 retaliatory [1] 35/12
prior [10]
36/1 36/2 36/2
review [15]
privacy [1] 30/23
reason [6] 10/16 14/1716n reviewed [5] 4/2 7/1 7/6 18/9
priveledged [1] 28/24
17/19 28/18 36/9
19/25
privilege [6] 16/23 16/24
reasonable [3] 11/1 11/9
reviewing [ 11 4/5
. 22/11 22/12 35/25 36/6
11/25
reviews [4] 7/13 7/15 11/4
privileged [4] 16/8 28/25 29/2 reasonably [2] 23/14 23/18
24/19
30/11
reasons [3] 9/17 14/13 36/9 right [12]
privileges [81 · 8/23 13/9 14/2 rebuttin·g [2] 33/16 36/18
rise [2] 9/12 33/16
23/17 25/20 32/2 34/13 36/15 recall [2] 5/22 12/19
room [3] 17/11 17/1417/21
probably [1] 36/21
receive [2] 16/18 22/15
RPR [2] 1/22 38/22
problem [1] 7/22
received [8] 16/14 16/16 19/1
problematic [1] 34/24
25/18 26/3 26/5 29/6 38/10
problems [1] 17/25
safeguarding (2] 10/11 10/13
receiving [1] 17/1
procedures [6] 11 /12 11 /13
said [51 7/12 20/7 25/16
recited [1] 11 /4
13/10 23/1 23/3 34/16
33/19 38/13
recognize [1] 5/25
proceeded [2] 12/1 28/4
SALT [8] 112 1/15 2/8 3/10
recommendations [1] 14/5
proceeding [1] 23/24
8/10 24/14 27/14 38/5
record (10]
process [7] 19/5 21 /1 23/12 recorded [1] 38/13
same [6] 7/14 11/3 20/17
31/20 34/23 35/1 35/17
20/17 21/7 22/10
recording [4] 18/1 38/11
processes [1] 36n
San [1] 23/11
38/13 38/15
proctored [5] 19/3 19/7 19/14 redacted [3] 12/8 16/9 16/22 say [15]
19/17 27/8
reference [3] 4/18 8/617/14 saying [11 7/15
proc~oring [1 O]
says [10]
referred [1] 31/25
proctorship [7] 9/25 11 /19
Scappatura [1] 10/7
refusal [21 8/15 36/5
11/21 12/2 31/16 31/18 32/17 regarding [1] 3/13
scheduled [2] 21 /4 29/4
protect [3] 617 20/6 28/7
SCOTT [1] 1/14
regardless [1] 6/25
protected [1] 29/2
Regional [4] 3/11 8/10 24/15 screams [1] 29/6
protecting [21 30/23 36/6
scrutinize (1] 15/20
27/14
protocol [21 23n 28/15
season [1] 10/20
reinstated [2] 27/8 36/16
protocols [2J 31 /6 31 /8
reinstatement [2J 29/8 36/13 second [8] 5/7 5/17 6/11 717
provide [31 7/22 11/11 35/3
11 /9 20/24 30/1 31 /1
relating [1] 1417
provided [6] 9/14 24/3 24/10 release [1] 14/3
seconds [1] 19/25
26/15 31/11 34/20
secrecy [3] 34/5 35/22 35/24
relied [1] 23/18
providers [2] 4/19 5/1
section [2] 5/3 13/7
rely [1] 16/2
provides (51 4/19 5/1 10/25 · remain [1] 32/8
see [3] 4/24 717 9/10
21/20 31/25
seek [11 36/13
remaining (2) 4/7 14/20
providing [2] 5/2 21/8
seems [1] 36/12
renewal [1] ~/23
provision [5] 13/14 14/18
seen [1] 29/23
rephrase [1] 33/22
16/3 22/25 32/20
provisions [1] 14/18
psychiatrist [1] 24/10
purpose [6] 10/10 10/12
29/25 35/7 35/8 35/13
purposes [8] 16/9 16/18
16/22 17/1 22/15 23/24 27/22
29/13

s

sense [1] 13/13
sent [3] 7/2 25/25 32/14
series [1] 717
serious [31 24/17 24/23 26/12
serving [2] 4/19 5/2
set [3] 15/8 24/13 38/14
seven [3] 19/8 19/16 25/22
several [1] 7/15
shall [1] 13/7
sham [2] 27/22 28/2
shape [1] 24/15
share [3] 16/11 22/6 26/25
shared [2] 19/24 23/19
sharing [1] 20/1
she's [3] 30/17 31/10 31/20
shifting [1] 28/3
shoot (1] 3/22
Shorthand (1) 38/9
shortly [1 J 12/25
should [10]
show [11 27/24
showing [2] 26/11 29/24
shown [1] 14/14
shroud [1] 20/11
shrouded [2] 23/13 34/5
similar [1] 14/9
simple [1] 35/24
simply [3] 11/18 33/5 36/23.
sit [1] 29/14
site [2] 31/2 31/2
sites [1] 32/20
situation [3] 19/4 19/6 19/11
six [2] 19/8 25/20
six-month [1] 25/20
8/12 24/6
skills [51 1120
24/12
slip [2] 17/11 17/20
slip-and-fall [2] 17/1117/20
sloppy [1] 36/3
so (36]
so it [1] 12/25
so-called [11 29/1
sole [1] 8/7
some [26)
somebody's [1] 25/3
somehow (1] 12/1
something [8] 16/19 24/1
25/13 26/2 29/25 32/18 33/13
35/9
sometime [2] 17/12 21/5
sorry [3] 9/2 16/15 29/18
sort [9] 7/5 8/19 10/17 11/23
13/13 14/16 35/5 35/6 36/13
SOUTH [3J 1/15 2/4 2/8
Southwick [2] 26/3 26/6
speaks [1] 27/25
specific [1] . 8/14
specifically [1] 12/9
spinal [2] 7/3 24/22
sponsoring [1] 4/20
springs [11 20/12
[11 38/4
staff [21 22/21 32/2
standard [81 5/10 10/5 13/17
13/22 13/23 14/9 18/14 32/21
standards [1] 13/21
stands [1] 17/16
start [3] 4/15 31 /18 34/13
started [2] 16/~ 32/16

an

ss

01256
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

s

unaffiliated (1] 7/6
tape [1] 25/6
tell [4] 10/2110/2318/8 30/9 Unanswered [1) 20/1
starters [ 1] 3/19
uncontroverted [1] 33/20
telling [1] 19/23
starts [1] 17/18
under [11]
ten [2] 25/1 35/23
state [13]
~nderlying [1] 29/3
ten-year [1] 25/1
state's [2] 17/6 27/23
underscore [1] 11/16
terms [2] 20/15 25/15
statement [1] 24/4
understand [5] 34/15 34/17
testimony [2] 35/10 35/13
states [1] 23/1
34/21 34/23 36/9
than [7] 9/22 10/1 O 10/13
status [1] 8/4
understanding [2] 28/9 28/11
27/13 29/25 32/5 36/13
statute [4] 4/18 10/17 17/6
undertaken (2) 31/13 34/17
thank [10]
17/7
undertook [1] 32/23
thanks [3] 29/16 34/1 37/3
statutes [2] 15/24 27/23
undisputed [5] 5/19 6/7 6/11
that's [25]
statutory [1] 35/19
19/23 30/2
their [11]
still [6] 11 /24 18/3 18/3 27/9
unfortunately [1) 3/24
them [6] 18/11 19/10 19/15
29/23 30/22
unilateral [1) 18/11
26/19 30/13 36/22
STONE [1] 1/12
Union [11 2/4
then [14]
stop [1] 25/7
unquote [1] 33/4
theories [1] 35/22
STREET [2] 1/15 2/8
unrebuttable [1] 6/20
there [50]
strenuously [1] 28/14
unrebutted [1] 6/19
thereafter [1] 28/17
stressed [1] 26/20
until [7] 16/1 16/5 25/18 26/1
therefore [2] 6/13 36/19
strike [1] 36/1
26/10 26/13 32/10
these [11]
subject [4] 13/9 13/17 22/11
up [1] 29/7
they [35]
36/20
they're [6] 18/1 0 23/6 23/25 updated [2] 7/25 8/3
subjecting [11 34/11
Updike [5] 3/11 6/3 9/7 24/3
25/5 26/21 33/20
subjective [2] 5/20 33/21
33/11
they've (1] 30/1
subjects [1] 36/22
upon [2) 9/24 16/3
thing [7] 9/12 17/15 22/24
submit [3] 11/3 24/2 31/7
use [1] 19/14
25/9 25/9 29/12 33/8
submitted [8] 6/2 6/11 6/19
UTAH [12]
things (10]
23/17 30/1 30/10 31/5 32/18
Utah's [1] 13/20
think (38]
subsequent [2] 6/6 13/9
third [6] 1/1 6/15 13/24 14/4
substantial [3] 32/22 32/24
V
24/10 31/4
33/7
various [1] 30/4
this (65]
substantive (1] 34/16
vehemently [2] 26/23 28/13
thoroughly [1] 35/22
substantively [11 34/18
verbatim [1] 26/19
those [19)
substitute [11 28/15
version [11 34/23
thought [2) 3/16 30/21
subsume [11 19/12
three [6] 6/16 8/14 8/16 24/9 versus (1] 34/22
successful [1] 9/24
very [10]
25/19 30/14
such [3] 11/13 13/10 23/2
vex [1] 10/8
through [7] 7/7 12/21 14/1
suffered [1] 17/13
view [3] 5/20 5/20 7/12
22/20 28/4 29/7, 32/16
sufficient [1] 36/23
viewed [1] 7/4
thrown [1] 16/5
suggest [2] 20/22 21 /24
volumes [1] 28/1
time [19]
suggests [11 35/12
today [1] 3/12
suit [11 16/9
together [1] 27/5
sum [1] 35/15
waiving [1] 16/24
told [8] 7/21 17/21 17/23
summary [211
22/19 26/6 26/8 28/18 30/17 Wanda [2] 3/11 6/3
support [1] 26/22
too [5] 3/23 4/2 10/22 15/19 want [13]
suppose [11 11/24
wanted [3] 8/2 12/17 29/19
24/25
sure [1] 8/2
was [108)
took [2] 9/6 33/14
surgeries [1] 31 /2
wasn't [1] 28/9
total [1] 35/15
surgery [2] 7/4 31 /2
way [6] 23/25 24/15 24/18
touchstone [1] 20/12
surrounding [1] 35/23
28/14 28/19 31/19
toward [1] 6/1
suspended [3] 21 /23 23/5
we [68]
transcribed [3] 1/22 38/11
26/17
we're [6] 3/12 5/15 17/7
38/14
suspending [1] 13/15
27/23 27/24 28/19
Transcript [1] 117
suspension [32]
we've [12]
transcription [1] 38/13
week [1] 17/15
trial [1] 5/13
T
well [17]
tried [2] 23/26 24/13
tab [3] 4/17 5/17 15/7
triggered [3] 17/14 32/9 32/14 were [42]
table [1] 3/8
what [27]
true [1] 38/12
take [9] 13/10 14/25 18/9
what1s [3] 10/22 18/13 18/13
ry
[1]
24/14
18/11 18/16 18/17 19/3 26/23 t
whatever [4] 17/18 18/10
34/10
t rylng [2] 12/24 31/20
two [9] 4/1 5/6 6/2 9/6 15/24 25/2 29/14
taken [6] 6/9 6/16 6/17 11 /1
when [14]
19/9 24/9 31/15 33/9
13/17 36/14
where [6] 9/25 13/10 19/4
typewriting [1 J 38/12
takes [2] 34/15 34/25
27/23 35/6 38/15
typo
[11
15/11
taking [51 6/5 7 /19 8/1 1 18/11
whether [1 OJ
24/5
which [33]
talked [21 18/25 36/5
while [21 24/22 30/22
Uh [1] 9/2
talking [11 34/13
who [5] 7/2 9/7 9/9 26/1 30/3
ulterior [2) 7/5 35/7
talks [2] 12/9 14/10
Whoever [1] 26/8
ultimately [2] 7/6 36/15

whole [2] 20/25 34/22
whom [1] 6/4
why [11]
will [35]
wish [1] 10/8
within [3] 25/1 36/7 36/20
without (17]
won't [1] 12/11
work [1] 24/5
worry [1] 18/2
would [23]
wouldn't [1] 8/20
written [5] 7/25 8/14 8/18
31/6 31/8
wrong [3] 31/2 31/2 32/11
wrongful [1] 10/9

y
Yea [1] 4/14
Yeah [2] 10/23 10/23
year [3] 21/12 25/1 25/1
years [3] 7/18 8/4 24/9
yes [51 12/20 13/2 17/3 21/19
24/18
you (50]
you're [1] 19/6
you've [2] 4/2 21 /5
your [88]

w

~

u

01257
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

AddendumG

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Jonathan A. Dibble (0881)
Elaina M. Maragakis (7929)
Erin M. Adams (15979)

I RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
Fax: (801) 532-7543
jdibble@rgn.com
emaragakis@rgn.com
eadams@rgn.com

Attorneys for Defendants IASIS Healthcare Holdings, Inc., Salt Lake Regional Medical Center,
Alan Davis, MD. and Wanda Updike, MD.
IN THE THIRD ruDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JODIE K. LEVITT, M.D.,
Plaintiffs,

v.
IASIS HEALTH CARE HOLDINGS, INC., a
Delaware Corporation; SALT LAKE REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER, LP, a Delaware Limited
Partnership, DBA Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center; ALAN DAVIS, M.D., WANDA UPDIKE,
M.S.; am;i DOES INIO,

DECLARATION OF
ALAN M. DAVIS, M.D.
Case No. 160900952

Judge Andrew H. Stone
Tier III

Defendants.

I, Alan M. Davis, M.D., declare as follows:
1.

I am over 21 years of age and have personal knowledge of the facts contained in

this declaration.

2.

I am a physician at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center ("SLRMC") and during

the relevant period I was Chief of Staff and Chair of the Medical Ex~cutive Committee
("MEC''), a peer review body at SLRMC.
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3.

My responsibilities as MEC Chair included maintaining and improving high

quality health care for the patients at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center,
4.

This included reviewing quality issues that might arise with regard to physician

care of patients at SLRMC. For example, one of the MEC's responsibilities is to consider
whether action is required in the event that questions are raised regarding a physician's conduct
or treatment of a patient.

5.

Among the actions that certain individuals at SLRMC can take is to summarily

suspend a physician for the purpose of ensuring patient safety and improving and providing high
quality healthcare to the patients. In some instances, the MEC can recommend a course of action
to assist a physician in improving his or her skills, thereby eliminating the concerns that may
have prompted a summary suspension. One such course of action is recommending that a
physician complete a proctorship.

6.

It is my understanding that Dr, Jodie Levitt alleges the following:
•

In September 2011, Dr, Levitt applied for a two-year renewal of her medical staff
appointment and privileges at SLRMC. On or about December 29, 2011
("December 29 Letter"), SLRMC granted Dr. Levitt a six-month conditional
approval, noting she had "several peer reviews pending."

•

On January 30, 2012, the Credentialing Committee wrote a letter ("January 30
Letter") to Dr. Levitt addressing three items, Among other things, the January 30
Letter noted that Dr. Levitt had failed to list or discuss on her re-application for
privileges her hospitalization for depression. The letter requested an update on
her condition including any medications she may still be taking for her depression

2
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and if they would affect her motor skills or judgment. The letter also requested
her to submit written protocols for her procedures that were under peer review.
7.

Ten ofDr. Levitt's cases were sent to neurosurgeons with fellowships in spinal

surgery for review in 2011 and 2012, These reviewing specialists were not affiliated with
SLRMC.

8.

A situation with Dr. Levitt arose in early February 2012, which required

immediate action. Accordingly, Dr, Wanda Updike, former MEC Chair, Jeff Frandsen, CEO of
SLRMC and I, as Chair of the MEC, met with Dr. Levitt on February 14, 2012. We discussed
with her the action she had taken in February and our concerns, including the issues which had
been raised by peer review. To the protect patients, we issued a summary suspension. The
suspension was initially for 28 days, and was thereafter ratified by the MEC,
9.

By letter dated February 15, 2012, Mr. Frandsen set forth the criteria requested by

the MEC, the completion of which would result in the reinstatement of Dr. Levitt's privileges,
including a proctorship,
10.

Neither I nor, to my knowledge, any member of the MEC had any motive to

injure Dr. Levitt financially or otherwise,
11.

My only motivation (and, to my knowledge, the only motivation of the MEC) in

issuing the suspension, or in taldng any action that affected Dr. Levitt prior to or following the
suspension, was to protect patients. There were no competing neurosurgeo~s involved in this
decision and there was no motive to injure her financially or otherwise.
12.

The swnmary suspension was imposed in good faith and without malice. All other

actions I took in regards to Dr. Levitt prior to or following the suspension were taken in good
faith and without malice towards her. ·

3
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I had no intent nor did I make any effo1i to interfere with Dr. Levitt,s existing or
potential economic relations.

Dr. Levitt successfully completed the recommended proctorship and her hospital
privileges were reinstated.
Dr. Levitt alleges that she requested a fair hearing, and that I denied that request,

That is incorrect. Indeed, I never denied Dr. Levitt's request for a fair hearing. Instead, I
informed her that proceeding with the hearing process would probably postpone a decision on
her privileges beyond 30 days, which would then make her summary suspension reportable to

the NPDB. She did not respond as to whether she wished to proceed with a fair bearing.
Instead, she completed the proctorship and was reinstated.

On occasions when Dr. Levitt attempted to obtain peer review privileged
information from me, I infom1ed her that I could not talk with her about her cases that were
being peer reviewed. That was, according to my understanding, for the purpose of p1·otecting the
peer review privilege.
DATED this

f~

day of December, 2017.

Alan M. Davis~ M.D.

1437201
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Jonathan A. Dibble (0881)
Elaina M. Maragakis (7929)
Erin M. Adams (15979)
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER P.C.
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500

Fax: (801) 532-7543

~

jdibble@rqn.com
emaragakis@rqn.com
eadams@rqn.com

Attorneys for Defendants IASIS Healthcare Holdings, Inc., Salt Lake Regional Medical Center,
Alan Davis, MD. and Wanda Updike, MD.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JODIE K. LEVITT, M.D.,
Plaintiffs,

v.
IASIS HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS, INC., a
Delaware Corporation; SALT LAKE REGIONAL
MEDICAL CENTER~ LP, a Delaware Limited
Partnership, DBA Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center; ALAN DA VIS, M.D., WANDA UPDIKE,
M.S.; and DOES 1-10,

DECLARATION OF WANDA UPDIKE,
M.D.
Case No. 160900952.
Judge Andrew H. Stone
Tier III

Defendants.

I, Wanda Updike, M.D., declare as follows:
1.

I am over 21 years of age and have personal knowledge of_the facts contained in

this declaration.
2.

I am a physician at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center ("SLRMC") and in 2011 I

chaired the Medical Executive Committee ("MEC") and during 2012 I was a member of the
MEC, a peer review body at SLRMC.
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3.

My responsibilities on the MEC included maintaining and improving high quality

health care for the patients at Salt Lake Regional Medical Center.
4.

This included reviewing quality issues that might arise with regard to physician

care of patients at SLRMC. For example, one of the MEC's responsibilities is to consider
whether action is required in the event that questions are raised regarding a physician's conduct
or treatment of a patient.

5.

Among the actions that certain individuals at SLRMC can take is to summarily

suspend a physician for the purpose of ensuring patient safety and improving and providing high
quality healthcare to the patients. In some instances, the MEC can recommend a course of action
to assist a physician in improving his or her skills, thereby eliminating the concerns that may
have prompted a summary suspension. One such course of action is recommending that a
physician complete a proctorsh~p.
~

6.

It is my understanding that Dr. Jodie Levitt alleges the following:
•

In September 2011, Dr. Levitt applied for a two-year renewal of her medical staff
appointment and privileges at SLRMC. On or about December 29, 2011
("December 29 Letter"), SLRMC granted Dr. Levitt a six-month conditional
approval, noting she had "several peer reviews pending."

•

On January 30, 2012, the Credentialing Committee wrote a letter ("January 30
Letter") to Dr. Levitt addressing three items. Among other things, the January 30
Letter noted that Dr. Levitt had failed to list or discuss on her re-application for
privileges her hospitalization for depression. The letter requested an update on
her condition including any medications she may still be taking for her depression

2
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and if they would affect her motor skills or judgment. The letter also requested
her to submit written protocols for her procedures that were under peer review.
7.

A number of Dr. Levitt's cases were sent to neurosurgeons with fellowships in

spinal surgery for review in 2011 and 2012. These reviewing specialists were not affiliated with
SLRMC.

8.

A situation with Dr. Levitt arose in early February 2012, which required

immediate action. Accordingly, I, as former MEC Chair, Jeff Frandsen, CEO of SLRMC and
Dr. Alan Davis, Chair of the MEC, met with Dr. Levitt on February 14, 2012. We discussed
with her the action she had taken in February and our concerns, including the issues which had
~

been raised by peer review. To the protect patients, we issued a summary suspension. The
suspension was initially for 28 days, and was thereafter ratified by the MEC.
9.

By letter dated February 15, 2012, Mr. Frandsen set forth the criteria requested by

the MEC, the completion of which would result in the reinstatement of Dr. Levitt's privileges,
including a proctorship.
10.

Neither I nor, to my knowledge, any member of the MEC had any motive to

injure Dr. Levitt financially or otherwise.
11.

My only motivation (and, to my knowledge, the only motivation of the MEC) in

issuing the suspension, or in taking any action that affected,Dr. Levitt prior to or following the
suspension, was to protect patients. There were no competing neurosurgeons involved in this
decision and there was no motive to injure her financially or otherwise.
12.

The summary suspension was imposed in good faith and without malice. All other

actions I took in regards to Dr. Levitt prior to or following the suspension were taken in good
faith and without malice towards her.

3
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I had no intent nor did I make any effort to interfere with Dr. Levitt's existing or
potential economic relations.
Dr. Levitt successfully completed the recommended proctorship and her hospital
privileges were reinstated.
On occasions when Dr. Levitt attempted to obtain peer review privileged
infonnation from me, I infonned her that I could not talk with her about her cases that were
being peer reviewed. That was, according to my understanding, for the purpose of protecting the

peer review privilege.
DATED this _l 8~lia day of December, 2017.

Wanda Updike, M.D.

1437392
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Jonathan A. Dibble (0881)
Elaina M. Maragakis (7929)
Eri11 M. Adams (15979)
RAY QUINNEY

& NEBEKER P.C.

36 South State Stl'eet, Suite 1400
P.O. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
Fax: (801) 532-7543
jdibble@rgn.com
ema1·agalds@rgn.com
endams@rqn.com

Auorneys for Defendants IASIS Healthcare Holdfngs, Inc., Salt Lake Regional Medical Center,
Alan Davis, M~D. and Wanda Upd;ke, .M.D.
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
JODIE K. LEVJTT, M.D.,
Plaintiffs,

DECLARATION OF JEFF FRANDSEN

v.
IASIS HEALTHCARE HOLDINGS, INC.t a
Delaware Corpo1·ation; SALT LAKE REGIONAL
MEDJCAL CENTER, LP, a DeJaware Limited
Pa11nership, DBA Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center; ALAN DAVISt M.D., WANDA UPDIKE,
M.S.; nnd DOES 1-10,

Case No. 160900952

Judge Andrew H. Stone
Tier Ill

· Defendants.

Ii JeffFl'andsen, declare as follows:
l.

1 am over 21 years of age and have personal knowledge of the facts contained in

this declm·ation.

2.

I was the Chief Executive Officer of Salt Lake Regional Medical Center

("SLRMC") fo 201 l and 2012.
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I

3.

My responsibilities as CEO was to work with the medical staff and others in the

(iJ

hospital to maintain and improve high quality health care for the patients at Salt Lake Regional
Medical Center. This included reviewing quality issues that might arise with regards to
physician care of patients at SLRMC.
4.

In September 2011, Dr. Jodie Levitt applied for a two-year renewal of her medical

staff appointment and privileges at SLRMC,

5.

On or about December 29, 2011 ("December 29 Letter"), SLRMC granted Dr.

Levitt a sbMrionth conditional approval, noting she had "several peer reviews pending."
6.

Ten of Dr. Levitt's cases were sent to neurosurgeons with fellowships in spinal

surgery for review in 2011 and 2012. These reviewing specialists were outside of SLRMC.
7.

On January 30, 2012, the credentialing committee wrote a letter to Dr, Levitt

requesting three things from her. Among othe1· things the lette1· noted that Dr, Levitt had failed
to list or discuss on her re-application for piivileges her hospitalization for depression. The letter
requested an update on her condition. Her omission from her reapplication for privileges was
contrary to the requirements of the medical staff by-laws,• The letter specifically requested that
she inform the committee whether any medications she may still be taking for her depression
would affect her motor skills 01· judgment. The letter also requested her to submit written
protocols for her procedures that were under peer review.
8.

Dr. Levitt did not give me any cutl'ent information about how any medication she

was taking for depression could affect her motor sldlls or judgment.
9.

Thereafter, a situation with Dr. Levitt arose in early February that required

immediate action. Accordingly, Dr. Wanda Updike, outgoing chair of the MEC, Dr. Davis,
M,D., MEC Chair and I met with Dr. Levitt on February 14, 2012. We discussed with her the

2
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action she had taken in F~ry and our concerns, including issues which had been raised by
peer review. To protec~the patients, we issued a summary immediate suspension, The
suspension was initially for 28 days.
10.

The suspension was later ratified by the members of the MEC.

11.

The suspension was for only 28 days so that Dr, Levitt could complete a

proctorship and be reinstated without having to report this action to the NPDB. Any suspension
beyond 30 days would have to be repo11ed to the NPDB.
12,

I had no motive to iajure Dr. Levitt financially or otherwise.

13.

My only motivation in issuing the summary suspension was to protect patients.

The summary suspension was imposed in good faith, and without malice.
14.

On February 15, 2012, the day after I met with Dr. Levitt and Dr. Updike and Dr.

Davis, I sent a letter to Dr. Levitt confirming the agreement for her to complete a proctorship
during the 28 day suspension so she could be reinstated with privileges at SLRMC.
15.

Dr. Levitt completed the recommended proctorship and her hospital privileges

were reinstated.
16.

On occasions when Dr. Levitt attempted to obtain peer review privileged

information from me, I informed her that I could not talk with her about her cases that were
being pee1· reviewed. That was, according to my understanding, a requirement to protect the peer
review privilege. However, I did give her a list of her cases that were being peer reviewed.
DATED this~ay ofDecember, 2017.

1437405
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SALT LAKE
.REGIONAL MEDfCAt CENTE-~.
November 23:.2011

Jodie K Levitt;-MD
:82; South J100 East·
S.~it¢ 303
Salt Lake Cityi UT S4102

Re: Reappo~tm:ent to· t~e Medical Staff.

D~r. Dr. Levitt:
On behalf of tb~ JSoar4 ofT~ste~ I ~ish to inform you that your reappoimmen~ to the Active M~qical

Staff pf Salt take Regj(?ria1 Mecf~aal Cent~r a.nd renewal of priyH~g.~s in Nc-Qro~rge-i;J,· have·beenapproved. As jOR have seyqra_lpeer reviews pffn<lir1g1 itis tJt~ir recomn,~ndatio11. iluit yo,rbe appr{}ved

~

fnra.six-mo11tl1 conili,io1i_trlt~appou1h1teui 1n·order tit at tlley migltt review t/Jeir dispositio_hs i;, a mot~
timely ma,me.r. Also, flu~ Ct¢dentials C-oinmittet! has-requestedfllrther do1'jfic(liiou: P11 ioirr
II usprta liz~do,1. ln._th e la$(jlve J'e«rsJutd riiediqarkms illat yo.a miglzt he.1aliing tkai may effet:( e!tlter
_vo«r clinica/j11dg_nre111 or:n.u1.t1Ji' .~kil.ls. Your medical sraffpetiod is for 09/29/2011 .to ·03;2912012-.
Th~ reappointment is .subject to al1 t~e tenn~ and coMitions of your initial appointme~i; and p~v ~<?US
reap_poinnnents~ Emd the Byi.aws, Rules and Regulations, and Policies. of the Hospital. and :Y.ledlcal $taffin
force during the term ·of.your appointmetlt.
The-clinical privileges ·:were. gra.n~ed -~ .requested,

We hepe for a c~ntinue<l strong relation snip wi~ you and the tommunity we .serve..

~·r:µ____
{~randsen
Chief Bx.ec\ltivo Officer
JF/mj

Encfosure

. lOStrEast South TempleJ ..SaltL~ City.,,·u_tah.84102

· t;

&OLlSb:4717 F!. &OtJS.0.4S7i .
. ...
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SALT LAKE
. REt?IONAL M·E.OlCAi.. CENTER

January 30. 2012
Jodie Levitt MD
82 South 1100 Bast. Suite 3()3
Salt Lake City, Utah 84t02
Dear Dr. Levitt

me,

Tlie Credentials Coinmitw.e ·met re~ntjy and re'i-iewed your
1!,Stb~ .¢nd of your sn:c month .conditional
reappointment.is «>ming ~p uiMarch 2p 1"2•. We-r~view.ed tlie$.-~ that were-sent out to-~ ~mal
r~vi~W~ ~d two::othe_r.;r~ent.occu~nces. tliat,are pending ~ew. i'he-Cred~a]s,~nurutteeregues"ts
the-following :tbr_coritinitation ·ofy~r privileges .at SaltLake Regional iv,(e~ioal. Center:
1.. ~view ofyo~r cas·~ .fmd there·ha.ve been sever~ CS;FJ¢aks in the last few yes.rs., Theret'or~.1?'/e.
·recom~e:nd ,tTJatyou.~stablish-. ~ \yiitten pro~~q.<;Sl_ for handling CSP.leaks mthefu1ure. You :ti~d to

submit this in '9.'nting to the Me~icai-staft..'Officeiby M~ 1, 20 J2.

,r--

·

2. ·Reyiew. of your oas~s finds that-you. have had 1hree wrong_ site stu-geries in tb~ J~t few yean;. We
recon1mend'that you·have. a\VJ,i#en 'protocplas to:bow.'you will_e$1,1is~ ooo:fir.rh~tioii of.correct site
surgery in the Gpel'.at~g tooml· The Conuriittee.fee.ls tiies~ are·~ous ~~nl:s. aud ifanother~ng
site occun-~nce happens; ~~·Co111mittee will discuss fiirth~ictfon which· ~ouJg ~~J4de tennbiatlon ot
pnvileges. ·Please submitth~ itt writing to the Meclic:al"Staff Offic~ by tfa:rcl:> .1, 2012.
.
.

.

· /.......

.

3. Review of.y.o.tJr r~poitrtment appUcatk>il..fin~s there ·was an-ortjission·of.your 4ospitali?-3~on i~·-:.........

Novemb~r.2009. '.The Cred~ntials Coinmittee takes-erro~o~issiQns fu-appl:i~on,s very-seiip:u~ly.
Eve~ though you hav~:i.d}$closcd.infom:i~tion to the.CEO> this'info~atiOD needs to b.e docum.ente(lm
yo~t reappein:tm~n~ appl!catfo~ fo_on;Jedor the ~dentiais CoD:11DJttee t0. ~ve:coilsisten~:~d ~~t
information. The C'Sb" is_nptl :ineritberofthe. Cr~d~tials Con:µnittee. -:Please c ~ the appli~tio~
by Maroh- l', '2012 anq. submit it.to· the °:tvfedical StaffO.f;fice. .
_..
.

Asswningyou respond in:a.sc1;tisfactoty and-timely mqnn~rtotlle.requests descrlbe.4 above, the
Credentials Commi~·wm . appJ;o'Ve a ~re<Hnontlt. c~~itiorial ·reappoin1;niertt. .-D.llling t1;us tum, ihe
Credentials· Conm.nttee
"be· reviewing your-~·es in·acon~ur~~t fashion.

will

Ii

.[fyou h.ave any que~'ti~>"QS r.egard,irig 1bese,nems•. yon ~e· welqom~ fo .rn~e an-appojntment to -.Ql~~ ~

tlie ·crcdentiaJs. Coriimfttt,e. · ··

.: _.· · . ·

.

·

· .

·.

.

·

Sin5t!cly•.·.
.· (/ /~·-..
. . ~y-1,
. . ..

.Ric~ -rielsen; ~ :

.. · ...

Credentials Coitun'ittee· Ch~ir
Siiclt Lake R.egic;malJv.1'.edi~ ¢ent~
/mj
1050 East South Temple? Salt Lake City~. TJtah 84102.-

. T: 80L350A7l7.

·p; 801.350.4571 · .

·
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Cj

let£ ~an.dsen, CEO

February 15, 2012

Dear Dr. Levitt
l>er-the meeting with yourself)· Jeff.Frandsen, CEO, Dr. Alan Dav1s, and Qr. Wanda Updike on
Wednesday.. February 14~2.012. regarding-your privil~es at.Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center and .the actions takeriby the Medical Execulive C-ommittee; thefollowing is a
summary of those actions and requests;
··

G0

l. ~8-day·suspension of your privilege~ to practice~-Salt Lake. Regional M~ical Center

(both surgically an~ medically)
2. The minimum length ·of the Sl,lSpell~iQn period: should you .µiee~ the. foUowii)g cnteri~
will.remain .at .least 14· days beginning: February lS, 2012. 1-!o-wev~rt tl1is timeframe wilf

Ci

be at.the sole discretlon.oftbe Chief of Staff and CEQ, collectively.
3. Below are the cr~ter.io.·re.qoesJed by th~ .Executl.Ye Con1mittee!
a~ Submit a prociorlng plat1 to the C_bief of Staff, which is: to include:
i Procforing by a neurosurgeon only

ii. P~ctoring•ofone lumbar case

iii. Proctorlng of one cervical c~
iv. Proctoring of four other cases to be proposed by you and approved by the
Cbief rifSlaff that would pert~n. t~ tbe area.s 9fdinical or.procedural
concern as discussed v..icb.you in this meeting.

v; ·. Reapply· for privileges as outlined by the Credentials. Co~nmittee letter
dated January 30, 2012, w.hicb has been .given ·10 you. This letter was
signed· by Dr~ Richard i\1elsen, Committe!!-Chahmao
vi. Fully cpmply with oll of the requests of the aforementioned Crede~tials

Committee letter (Sectio.n 3.v.)
vii. Submit with signnnrrc. documentation of a-back-up coverage plan should
y_ou lie·out of town orothetwise b·ecome unable to candor your patients·
wflo may present tbcmsclves to Salt Lake RegionlJl Medical-Center for

services.
4. Privileges will'bc reinstated upon completion of Llll qriierln .note9, herein. 1-lowev~r> the

Medical Executive Committee and Administration reserve·the right' to take further or·
alternative step$ b~ed upon discovety of additional concerns or proactive and positive
remedtation-o f ideJltlfied nee.els for imptov~n1c:¢• regarding your ability to pro':"ide
high-quali~y palient c~rc.

i1i"'!u1l\:: /H.I '¥,i5C.l•·t: ! j 1

.-----.. .... -- ,

.

.

,•

:,0•' •

I

'•

~

,•t

- - · - - - - - - - - · · - - - ···-· ......... ,_.,. __ ..,f,...,,

01014
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Jodie Levi U
February lt 2012
i·age iwo
5.. Dwing.the period of suspension, your patients who preseht for care~ Sa.Ii. Lake .Regional
Medical Center will need to .be referred to nnother meqica} professional on calJ.for that
care. Jf tllere-is a6t a m~ical prQfc:ssionaJ available to appropriately care for your
patient, th~ patient \Yill likely need to be transferred to ~1orher facility (whjl~ maintaining
the strictest ofc¢,mp1iancc:·1o EMTALA laws).

Should you ha\'e any oth~r qu~sti'qns ot r~quests as to- terms and conditions of your
suspensiop. herein•d~flqed, pl~se contact Dr. Alan Davis,.Salt Lake Regional Medical
Center Chief of stair-; Th~ -contents ofthfs letter r.epr-esent (but are not exclus.ive ofJ the
directi,m of Salt Lake regi<mal'Medi-cal·Center's Medical Exec~tiv.e CotJlmiltee n1;1d

Adn1inistra tion..
fhahk you Dr-Levitt We·sJncereJy hQpefor your success as you move forward.

<iD

Alan Davis M.D.

Wanda Updike; M.D.

.I

---

Jodie Levitt;,·~D.
(Pleas~-sign as an-aclcnowledgement of acceptance of these tenns}
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